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A series of catastrophic regulatory failures have focused attention on the
weakened condition of regulatory agencies assigned to protect public health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment. The destructive convergence of
funding shortfalls, political attacks, and outmoded legal authority have set the
stage for ineffective enforcement, unsupervised industry self-regulation, and a
slew of devastating and preventable catastrophes. From the Deepwater Horizon
spill in the Gulf of Mexico to the worst mining disaster in forty years at the Big
Branch mine in West Virginia, the signs of regulatory dysfunction abound. Many
stakeholders expected that President Barack Obama would recognize and ameliorate this unacceptable state of affairs, but his administration has largely ignored
it, instead accepting Republican claims that over-regulation is the overriding
problem du jour.
One central reason for the systemic failure of effective health and safety
regulation is the fact that many regulatory matters enter and exit the White
House through the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) little-known but
extraordinarily powerful Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
Centralized White House regulatory review began in the Nixon administration
and OIRA was created in 1980. Over four decades, the process has evolved into
a relentless gauntlet for public health, worker safety, and environmental protection initiatives, subjecting the agencies’ efforts to implement their demanding
statutory mandates to withering rule-by-rule review. Analogous to examining the
roots of individual trees without realizing that they are part of a dying forest, this
myopia has obscured the causes and effects of regulatory failure for five presidents
from both parties.
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This Article proposes that the President terminate centralized White House
regulatory review of individual rules and abolish OIRA’s role in regulatory affairs. The President can exert sufficient control over rulemaking through the
political appointees he has selected to lead the agencies, and they can work on
cross-cutting issues affecting more than one agency within the framework of the
Domestic Policy Council.
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INTRODUCTION
Catastrophic regulatory failures dominate the headlines with a frequency that is unprecedented. Tragedies as diverse as the Deepwater Horizon spill
in the Gulf of Mexico, the Big Branch mine disaster, one billion gallons of
overflowing coal ash sludge in Tennessee, the deadly Texas City and Tesoro
refinery explosions, tainted food and drugs, and increasingly dangerous
consumer product imports can all be traced to corporate scofflaws repeatedly allowed to run amok by beleaguered regulatory agencies suffering from
acute dysfunction.1
Although everyone should be able to agree that these events are intolerable, thoughtful analysis is sidetracked by the nation’s polarized debate
over the role of government. Conservative commentators argue that accidents like the Gulf spill are the inevitable byproducts of industrialization,
having little to do with government failure.2 They say that overregulation is
a far more serious problem than underregulation because excessive rules
hobble the country’s long-delayed recovery from a devastating worldwide
recession.3 Progressive commentators respond that these events reflect the
demise of a regulatory state that was weakened to the point of dysfunction
during the presidency of George W. Bush and never given an opportunity
to recover.4 One of the government’s most important jobs is to compel
1.
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et al., Consumer Protection in an Era of Globalization, in
IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 3–21 (Cary
Coglianese et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter IMPORT SAFETY] (describing the American recall
of millions of Chinese-manufactured toys covered in lead paint); Ian Urbina, No Survivors
Found After West Virginia Mine Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1; Leslie Wayne, The
Enemy at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at B1 (reporting on noxious and corrosive sulfurinfused drywall imported from China); Aaron Clark et al., Tesoro Refinery Blast Kills 5, May
Be Worst Since ‘05 (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2010, 12:49 EDT), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFn6ib6Jhg6w&pos=8; Jared A. Favole &
Alicia Mundy, FDA Cites Two Chinese Heparin Makers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2009, 5:51 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123999583350129829.html; Ryan Knutson, Blast at BP Texas
Refinery in ‘05 Foreshadowed Gulf Disaster, PROPUBLICA (July 27, 2010, 10:30 PM), http://
www.propublica.org/article/blast-at-bp-texas-refinery-in-05-foreshadowed-gulf-disaster.
2.
See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., Drilling for Certainty, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010,
at A23.
3.
See, e.g., Issa Makes Submissions Reflecting Input from Job Creators on Regulatory
Barriers to Job Creation Public, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, http://
oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1115&Itemid=29 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2011) (results of an initiative by Representative Darrell Issa to identify
regulations to target). Representative Issa wrote approximately 160 trade associations representing large, medium, and small businesses, and solicited their “assistance in identifying
existing and proposed regulations that have negatively impacted job growth in [their] members’ industry.” See Issa’s Letter to Business Groups, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011, 11:28 EST),
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/01/04/5763871-issas-letter-to-business-groups.
4.
See, e.g., SIDNEY SHAPIRO ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REGULATORY
DYSFUNCTION: HOW INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES, OUTDATED LAWS, AND POLITICAL
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industry to implement redundant, fail-safe mechanisms to protect public
health and the environment. Spills, explosions, tainted food, dangerous
products, and unhealthy air pollution represent chronic failures by government to prevent conduct that unfortunately lies in the mainstream of
business as usual.
During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama repeatedly declared
that the role of government is to help people when they cannot help themselves,5 raising the strong expectation that he would sponsor affirmative
reform to prevent the damage produced by the sharper edges of a capitalist
economy. This explanation—advocating forceful intervention in situations
where well-organized special interests cause irrevocable harm that individual citizens cannot deter—evocatively promised that, if elected,
candidate Obama would adopt fundamentally different policies than his
predecessors. The President’s health care initiative and his push to reform
financial markets reinforced the impression that active intervention to
strengthen government would be his administration’s prevailing mode.6
But despite his selection of experienced and well-respected appointees
to lead the eight protector agencies created to protect public health, worker
safety, and the environment7—most notably, Lisa Jackson at the EnvironINTERFERENCE CRIPPLE THE “PROTECTOR AGENCIES” (2009), available at http://www.
progressivereform.org/articles/RegDysfunction_906.pdf.
5.
See, e.g., Barack Obama, Closing Argument Speech at the Canton Memorial Civic
Center (Oct. 27, 2008) (transcript available at http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/10/
obama_closing_argument_speech_1.html).
6.
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill,
with a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19; Edward Wyatt, Veto Threat Raised Over
Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at B1.
7.
The eight agencies include, in the order of the approximate sizes of their workforce: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA); the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE); the
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA); and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC). EPA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $7.6
billion and 17,252 “full-time equivalent” (FTE) staff positions. See EPA, FY 2010 BUDGET
IN BRIEF 7 (2009), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=
P10093CX.txt. FDA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $2 billion and 8,524
FTEs. FDA, FY 2011 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET REQUEST ALL PURPOSE TABLE—BUDGET
AUTHORITY, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/
BudgetReports/UCM202313.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). NRC’s enacted FY 2009
budget totaled approximately $1 billion and 3,848 FTEs. NRC, 2009–2010 INFORMATION
DIGEST 12–13 (2009), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/
staff/sr1350/v21/sr1350v21.pdf. MSHA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $347
million and 2,361 FTEs. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION: MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 4, http://www.dol.gov/dol/
budget/2011/PDF/CBJ-2011-V2-12.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). OSHA’s enacted FY
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mental Protection Agency (EPA), Margaret Hamburg at the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), and David Michaels at the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)—President Obama did not
make lasting commitments to substantially increase their budgets, support
them when they ran into political trouble, or update the outmoded laws
that undermine their efforts to police corporate misconduct.8
In the aftermath of the 2010 midterm elections, with conservatives
firmly in charge of the House of Representatives and already mounting an
attack on regulations that allegedly cripple the economy, President Obama
pivoted from neglect to repudiation, publishing an opinion piece in the Wall
Street Journal promising to create a “21st-century” system that eliminates
2009 budget totaled approximately $513 million and 2,147 FTEs. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY
2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION 4, http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2011/PDF/CBJ-2011-V2-11.pdf (last
visited Aug. 25, 2011). In 2011, BOEMRE had 1,172 FTEs. BOEMRE, CONTINGENCY
PLAN IN THE EVENT OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 2, http://www.doi.gov/
shutdown/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=240494 (last visited Aug. 25,
2011). NHTSA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $935 million and 607
FTEs. NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUDGET ESTIMATES: FISCAL YEAR 2010, 12, 14,
http://www.dot.gov/budget/2010/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
CPSC does not report enacted budget levels. In FY 2009, it reported an appropriation
totaling approximately $105 million and 483 FTEs. CPSC, 2010 PERFORMANCE BUDGET
REQUEST, at vi (2009), http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/reports/2010plan.pdf (last visited
Aug. 25, 2011). Apparent discrepancies between the size of an agency’s budget appropriations and its full-time staff are explained by the fact that they commit significant amounts of
their budgets on state grants. The total staff for all eight agencies was 36,433.
8.
Modest increases in some agency budgets were proposed but were quickly
eclipsed by deficit politics, with the President hastening to make deals with Republicans and
paving the way for deep cuts in the funding available to implement those protections. See,
e.g., Jim Efstathiou, EPA Budget Cut Will Restrict Enforcement of Clean-Air Rules, Activists Say,
BLOOMBERG (April 12, 2011, 4:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-12/
epa-budget-cut-will-restrict-enforcement-of-clean-air-rules-activists-say.html; Laura Walther, FY 2012 Budget Request Includes $583 Million for OSHA, EHS TODAY (Feb. 15, 2011,
11:43 AM), http://ehstoday.com/standards/osha/budget-request-includes-millions-osha-0215/.
The President has not defended the mission of the agencies or the performance of the
people he appointed to lead them in the face of blistering Republican attacks on overregulation, except in the context of explaining how far he is willing to go to eliminate
unnecessarily burdensome regulations. See, e.g., Alan Fram, Obama’s Push to Revamp Regulations, WASH. POST, May 30, 2011, at A21 (“Overall, the drive would save hundreds of
millions of dollars annually for companies, governments and individuals and eliminate
millions of hours of paperwork while maintaining health and safety protections for Americans, White House officials said.”). The President was missing in action during
congressional debate regarding legislation to strengthen regulation of deepwater oil production and mine safety. This approach was emblematic of the administration’s reluctance to put
much political capital on the line in the health, safety, and environmental arena. See, e.g.,
Vicki Smith, MSHA to Congress: Mine Safety Laws Need to Be Stronger, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 3, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/03/msha-congress-minesafety_n_830841.html (“MSHA chief Joe Main . . . told the chairman, Republican Rep. Tim
Walberg of Michigan, he was not recommending any particular legislation.”).
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“dumb” rules and avoids “excessive, inconsistent, and redundant regulation.”9
His State of the Union Address a few days later supported a five-year
freeze on domestic spending, ensuring that his administration will be hard
pressed to address the woefully inadequate funding that cripples agencies
assigned to protect public health, ensure worker and consumer safety, and
safeguard the environment.10 All hope of affirmative law reform disappeared until at least after the 2012 presidential election.
The President’s pivot was foreshadowed by his appointment of former
Harvard law professor Cass Sunstein as his “regulatory czar,” a position
formally known as the administrator of the Office of Management and
Budget’s (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
No regulation that would impose more than $100 million annually in
projected costs can go into effect without running the gauntlet at OIRA.
Sunstein, who has strong views on curtailing the economic impact on business of health, safety, and environmental laws,11 has continued the tradition
of OIRA serving as a one-way ratchet for weakening protective rules.12
This Article argues that centralized White House regulatory review is a
primary cause of regulatory failure that the nation can well do without.
Centralized review shoves policymaking behind closed doors, wastes
increasingly limited government resources, confuses agency priorities,
demoralizes civil servants, and, worst of all, costs the nation dearly in lost
lives, avoidable illness and injury, and destruction of irreplaceable natural
9.
Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan.
18, 2011, at A17; see also Cass Sunstein, Op-Ed., 21st-Century Regulation: An Update on the
President’s Reforms, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2011, at A17.
10.
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-stateunion-address).
11.
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005). Sunstein’s book, Laws of Fear, is an attack on the precautionary principle,
which Sunstein describes as “literally incoherent” in “its strongest forms.” Id. at 4. He
explains that the strong form of this principle requires regulation “whenever there is a
possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting evidence remains
speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are high.” Id. at 24. He contends
that powerful and irrational social forces feed average citizens’ overreaction to risk. Because
non-experts have difficulty factoring in the probability that a risk would occur and instead
panic in response to harm that has a very small chance of occurring, “the public’s demand for
government intervention can be greatly affected by probability neglect, so that regulators
may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions
are making people relatively insensitive to the (low) probability that dangers will ever come
to fruition.” Id. at 69. Sunstein sees these reactions as so extreme that he recommends
keeping the public from influencing government decisions that involve such risks: “[T]here
is [a risk that] high levels of public participation in technical domains [will] simply heighten
public fear, with unfortunate consequences for policy.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1161 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK
(2000)).
12.
See infra notes 230–303 and accompanying text.
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resources. The Obama administration’s continuation of centralized review is
a critical reason why his potentially transformative presidency has ignored
the urgency of reviving health, safety, and environmental agencies. At the
rate events are unfolding, this mistake could define his historical legacy in
the most negative of terms, as it has already defined the legacy of his predecessor, George W. Bush. Instead of perpetuating centralized review, the
President should recognize that final authority to formulate individual
regulation belongs with the political appointees who lead the agencies, with
the President retaining the authority to hire and fire those high-level officials if they do not do their jobs to his satisfaction.
Proponents of centralized review include some heavy hitters from the
legal academy, including Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan; former Department of Justice attorney John Yoo, who was a central architect of
President George W. Bush’s strategy for invoking executive powers; and
former Harvard professor Cass Sunstein.13 Other distinguished administrative law and policy scholars similarly defend presidential prerogatives,14
although a strong minority warns of its shortcomings.15 Most accept as
dogma that the President must exert rigorous, day-to-day control over
13.
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1994) (defending unitary executive theory, although not on constitutional grounds);
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1995); John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential
Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435 (1999).
14.
See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 879–82 (2003) (arguing that White House influence
over the process should be viewed as a welcome development); Christopher C. DeMuth &
Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075,
1080–88 (1986) (defending the Reagan process of regulatory review as a necessary and
appropriate exercise of presidential power); John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory
State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2006) (explaining how centralized review creates cost-effective rules); Robert Hahn & Robert E. Litan,
Why Congress Should Increase Funding for OMB Review of Regulations, BROOKINGS (Oct.
2003), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/10_ombregulation_litan.aspx (extolling the
virtues of a robust economic analysis of rules prompted by OIRA oversight).
15.
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006) (refuting the assumptions that agencies are captured
by stakeholders and that OIRA is immune from such pressures); Cynthia R. Farina, False
Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive,
12 J. CONST. L. 357 (2010) (contending that the President is poorly equipped to make the
expert judgments that Congress delegated directly to the regulatory agencies); Kevin M.
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 263
(2006) (arguing that an express delegation of authority to an agency administrator diminishes the President’s power to undertake centralized regulatory review that requires
substantive changes in rule proposals); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (decrying the intrusiveness of White House politicization of the administrative process).
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regulatory policy making.16 They further argue that cost-benefit analysis
must reign supreme in regulatory decision making and that OIRA must
enforce that discipline.17 In contrast, I contend that OIRA, with all the
flaws inherent in its mission and institutional design, occupies such a central role in the President’s universe that it blinds the White House to the
existence of agency dysfunction and regulatory failure and prevents a
concerted, desperately needed response to that far more significant phenomenon. To avoid confusing this crucial point, the following discussion
shoves to one side the question of whether the defective methodology of
cost-benefit analysis should continue to preoccupy regulatory agencies.18
Part I makes the case that under-regulation is an important and urgent
crisis confronting the nation and discusses the root causes of this condition.
Part II reviews the history of centralized review. From its antecedent as an
informal process that gave business executives and sympathetic political
aides a major voice in regulatory policy during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter
administrations, to its modern role as the headquarters of withering economic analysis of highly speculative regulatory costs, OIRA has fostered
deep suspicion of health, safety, and environmental agencies among White
House staff. This suspicion slowed the agencies’ momentum in their heyday
and has accelerated their decline. Part III examines the consequences of
these trends, concluding that they not only forestall badly needed affirmative regulation, but squander opportunities to solve problems before they
become intractable.

I. REGULATORY FAILURE
A. Dysfunction and Failure Defined
My working definition of agency dysfunction is a condition characterized by the emergence of chronic, severe, and distinct patterns of incapacity
16.
See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14; Graham et al., supra note 14; Hahn &
Litan, supra note 14.
17.
See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14; Graham et al., supra note 14; Hahn &
Litan, supra note 14.
18.
Cost-benefit analysis, which seems firmly entrenched, is justly criticized on
factual, legal, methodological, and ethical grounds, and I am no fan of it. But OIRA does
not write such analyses for individual rules; rather, those tasks are handled by robust groups
of economists working within the agencies. A proposal to abandon OIRA’s role in reviewing
individual rules does not prevent the President from continuing to require that cost-benefit
analyses be conducted. For a discussion of the problems with the methodology, see FRANK
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
(1991); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003).
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to fulfill statutory missions, as opposed to circumstances where an agency
program is ineffective a handful of times. Weakness in one or two programs
does not rise to the level of dysfunction, especially if an agency takes remedial action to resolve these problems before they threaten its credibility.
When a pattern of poor performance remains unaddressed, gradually developing into chronic weakness in standard setting and enforcement that
threatens workers, consumers, and breathers generally,19 as well as a regulated industry as a whole,20 an agency is on the cusp of dysfunction. A
dysfunctional agency presiding over a cluster of hazardous industrial practices creates conditions ripe for regulatory failure. So, for example, when a
set of circumstances emerges that could cause death, injury, and damage to
the environment, and the agency assigned to prevent these conditions is so
dysfunctional that it lacks the capacity to avert the threat, regulatory
failure is imminent. The Deepwater Horizon spill was preceded by weak or
non-existent safety rules and infrequent, ineffective inspections. The Big
Branch mine disaster was preceded by chronic violations of safety standards
and enforcement so anemic that the corporate operator had no incentive to
prevent the accident.21 This Article addresses instances of severe regulatory
failure that have occurred, as well as those that are imminent.
Conservative deregulators implicitly justify dysfunction by ignoring
the detailed statutory mandates Congress assigned to the agencies. This
ultra-pragmatic, extra-legal approach, articulated in its most extreme form
by activist Grover Norquist when he announced his goal as getting
government “down to the size where we can drown it in the bath tub,”22
also weakens the nation’s political fabric. Rendering statutory provisions
symbolic but leaving them on the books cannot help but corrode the public’s confidence in government.
For the relevant statutes to work as intended, failing agencies must be
rescued by the President, the Congress, and their own managers. When
none of these institutions launch effective revival efforts, a final symptom
of agency dysfunction is manifested. Most of the major health, safety, and
environmental statutes were developed in response to signature events;
19.
“Breathers” is used to connote citizens who, in their lives apart from work, are
exposed to environmental pollution of the air, water, and soil. “Consumers” are the same
people, but those who are exposed to hazards as a result of purchasing products, drugs, or
food.
20.
For example, the peanut industry lost an estimated $1 billion as a result of the
2008 Peanut Corporation of America salmonella recall. See, e.g., Christopher Doering,
Salmonella Recall is No Small Peanuts, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2009, 2:57 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2009/03/11/us-salmonella-peanuts-smallbusiness-idUSTRE52A61T20090311.
21.
See, e.g., Steven Mufson et al., Mine Cited for Litany of Safety Violations, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1.
22.
Robert Dreyfuss, Grover Norquist: ‘Field Marshal’ of the Bush Tax Plan, NATION,
May 14, 2001, at 11, 14.
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headline-grabbing tragedies used to be followed by law reform.23 But this
dynamic has virtually disappeared. Neither Congress nor the President has
exerted leadership to respond to the virtually unregulated hazards of deepwater oil production or deteriorating conditions in underground mining.24
In fact, of all the examples of dysfunction mentioned at the outset of this
Article and explained further below, only two led to the passage of legislation. The recall of dangerous toys prompted passage of the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) in 2008,25 but the new law
ducked the most pressing issues, doing little to strengthen the Consumer
Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) capacity to tackle the threats posed
by imported products, and the Republican-controlled House of Representatives is considering legislation to weaken it even further.26 And although
salmonella and E. coli outbreaks in food provoked passage of the Food
23.
An early and notable example is the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist fire, which led to the
enactment of workplace safety laws. See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, Editorial, A Fire that Still
Burns Bright, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2011, at A19. There are several more recent examples.
The leakage of the Love Canal’s industrial waste into nearby residential basements provoked
the enactment of the nation’s toxic waste cleanup law. See, for example, Senator Moynihan’s
statement in 126 CONG. REC. 30,937–39 (1980), which provides a background and chronology of seventy-one “discrete events . . . before . . . there was an effective and reasonably
complete response” following “the discovery of trichlorophenols and other hazardous substances” at Love Canal. The statement was delivered during a debate on the Stafford-Randolph
compromise bill, which was eventually modified and enacted as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628, 9651–9662, 9671–9675 (2006 & Supp.
II 2008)). Disasters including the Cuyahoga River catching on fire prompted passage of a
far stronger version of the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees,
and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 2279, 2282–90 (1996). The Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2006)), was “significantly reorganized and
expanded in 1972. ‘Clean Water Act’ became the Act’s common name with amendments in
1977.” Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/regulations/
laws/cwa.html (last updated Aug. 11, 2011). Trees stunted by acid rain in New England and
Canadian forests produced the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
104 Stat. 2399.
24.
Robin Bravender & Katie Howell, Fallout Begins After Senate’s Failure to Act on
Energy, Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/05/
05greenwire-fallout-begins-after-senates-failure-to-act-on-54000.html (“After the worst oil
leak in U.S. history and months of heated negotiations on energy and spill-response legislation, senators will head home for the August recess empty-handed.”); Kim Geiger et al.,
Miners’ Survivors Feel Let Down: A Year After a Blast Killed 29, a Safety Bill has Failed and
Efforts to Boost Enforcement are Mired in Appeals, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2011, at A18 (“ ‘We’ve
been messing around for a year,’ said Rep. George Miller (D- Martinez), who introduced a
bill last summer that would have dealt with the backlog and other issues brought to light by the
deadly explosion. ‘The sad thing is that nothing will happen until the next major disaster.’ ”).
25.
See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122
Stat. 3016 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (Supp. II 2008)).
26.
See Congress Should Not Weaken the CPSIA, CONSUMERS UNION (May 11, 2011),
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_product_safety/017727.html.
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Safety Modernization Act in 2010,27 congressional conservatives immediately threatened to defund the new law’s implementation, and deep cuts in
the new programs created by the statute seem inevitable in the current,
politically charged fiscal climate.28
Deeming an agency dysfunctional in achieving its statutory missions
necessarily depends upon subjective judgment. The continuum of regulatory failure is finegrained and reasonable observers could differ on when
oversights and mistakes degenerate into dysfunction. To circumvent disagreements about whether the lines drawn here are reasonable, the following
discussion features cases that cannot reasonably be considered close.
Several of these examples involve explosions that are easier to recognize as catastrophes than the relatively slow poisoning of a child who
mouths her lead paint-coated toys. Of course, an accident could happen in
the best of regulatory systems. But the major industrial disasters discussed
in this Article cannot be so easily dismissed: none of the extensive analyses
of those incidents referenced here have ever come close to concluding that a
responsible company with a strong safety culture that operated in a rigorous
regulatory environment was simply ambushed by a freak instance of bad
luck. Instead, report after report concludes that the absence of a strong
regulatory presence and corporate neglect of safety at the highest levels
were proximate causes for accidents that were waiting to happen.29

27.
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). See also Margaret Hamburg, Food Safety Modernization Act: Putting the Focus on Prevention, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 3, 2011, 4:53 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/01/03/food-safety-modernization-act-putting-focusprevention.
28.
The new law requires CPSC to develop a risk assessment methodology for identifying potentially dangerous products being shipped into the U.S. within two years of its
date of enactment, which was August 14, 2010. See 15 U.S.C. § 2066. The CPSC website
does not indicate that this mandate has been fulfilled. See Section 222. Import Safety Management and Interagency Cooperation, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM’N, http://
www.cpsc.gov/about/cpsia/sect222.html#presentations (last visited May 18, 2011). Republicans have also threatened to defund FDA food safety initiatives. Suzy Khimm, These GOP
Budget Cuts Might Make You Puke (or Worse): How Food Safety Could Fall Victim to the Republicans’ Budget-Slashing Mania, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 9, 2011, 1:01 AM), http://
motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/gop-budget-cuts-food-safety.
29.
See e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL &
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING, at vii (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L
COMM’N ON DEEPWATER HORIZON].
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B. Dysfunction and Failure Epitomized
1. Nuclear Plant Maintenance
The tsunami that hit Japan in the spring of 2011 triggered a nuclear crisis that experts attribute to a shockingly lax regulatory system. Japanese
regulators and the companies they oversee follow a practice known as
amakudari, or “descent from heaven,” that provides retired government
officials with “comfortable jobs at the companies they regulated.”30 The
practice is a symptom of the nuclear industry’s status as one of Japan’s
“most entrenched and coddled interest groups.”31
Thankfully, the Japan disaster prompted intensive investigative reporting by the New York Times on the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), which oversees America’s 104 nuclear power plants.
The conclusions were disconcerting to say the least, especially given fervent
bipartisan support for a dramatic expansion of nuclear power in this country, including President Obama’s pledge to subsidize the industry to the
tune of billions of dollars.32
Workers at the Byron nuclear plant in Illinois noticed in the fall of
2007 that piping used to circulate cooling water to essential emergency
equipment had corroded through and started to leak, causing a twelve-day
shutdown of the plant’s two reactors.33 The plant’s operator, the Exelon
Corporation, had known for years that the piping was degrading, but rather
than changing out the corroded equipment, the company kept downgrading
its internal guidance on the minimum thickness required for safety.34 The
NRC had failed to inspect the piping for the eight years preceding the leak
and, even when the problem came to regulators’ attention, they decided
only to “reprimand [Exelon] for two low-level violations.”35 If enough pipes
had ruptured during a reactor accident, “the result could easily have been a
nuclear catastrophe at a plant just 100 miles west of Chicago.”36 Concluding
that this troubling episode was symptomatic of pervasive problems at the
NRC, the New York Times noted that “most of the country’s 104 aging
30.
Martin Fackler & Hiroko Tabuchi, Lag in Closing a Japanese Nuclear Plant Reflects
Erosion of a Culture of Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2011, at A4.
31.
Id.; Yuri Kageyama & Justin Pritchard, Ties Bind Japan Nuke Sector, Regulators,
ABC NEWS (May 2, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13502692.
32.
See, e.g., Matthew Mosk, Environmental Groups Question Obama’s Support for Nuclear
Industry, ABC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/obamas-supportnuclear-industry-questioned/story?id=13158078 (reporting, among other evidence of the
President’s long-standing support for nuclear power, that he is especially close to Exelon, a
nuclear power company headquartered in Chicago).
33.
Tom Zeller, Jr., Nuclear Agency Beset by Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, May 8 2011, at A1.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
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reactors are applying for, and receiving, 20-year extensions from the N.R.C
[sic] on their original 40-year licenses” and that reform advocates contend
that “a thorough review of the system is urgently needed.”37 David Lochbaum, a reactor technology expert who has trained NRC personnel, told the
newspaper: “The only difference between Byron and Fukushima is luck.”38

2. Deepwater Oil Production
Less than a year before the Japanese nuclear meltdown, the Deepwater
Horizon, a drilling rig owned by Transocean and leased by British Petroleum
(BP) exploded. Eleven workers were killed by the raging fires that destroyed
the rig, and, over the course of several weeks, an estimated 205 million
gallons of crude oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico as the company and its
contractors struggled to gain control over the gushing well.39
The subsequent investigation revealed BP’s dismal track record for safety
during the decade preceding the spill.40 Detailed chronologies of the events
preceding the explosion reveal cost-cutting measures with grave and systematically ignored implications for safety. For example, four days before
volatile gases surged into the well and caused the explosion, BP employees
rejected a recommendation by employees of its contractor, Halliburton, that
twenty-one centralizers be installed to secure the well against such risks.41
“ ‘It will take 10 hours to install them,’ a BP official said in an internal
e-mail. ‘I do not like this.’ ”42

37.
Id.; see also Susan Q. Stranahan, A More Likely Nuclear Nightmare, IWATCH NEWS
(May 11, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/05/11/4540/more-likely-nuclearnightmare (explaining that the risk of fires at the 104 U.S. nuclear power plants was a
growing threat because even a small fire could trigger a meltdown but that the NRC “hardly
ever issues serious penalties for fires,” preferring to rely on “voluntary compliance and slaps
on the wrist”).
38.
Zeller, supra note 33.
39.
See, e.g., Bradley Blackburn, BP Oil Spill: Families Gather to Honor 11 Who Died,
Express Frustration with BP, Transocean, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
WN/bp-oil-spill-transocean-holds-memorial-11-lost/story?id=10739080; Maureen Hoch, New
Estimate Puts Gulf Oil Leak at 205 Million Gallons, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 2, 2010,
10:07 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/08/new-estimate-puts-oil-leak-at49-million-barrels.html.
40.
Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, a History of Boldness and Costly Blunders, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2010, at A1 (“Despite a catalog of crises and near misses in recent years, BP has been
chronically unable or unwilling to learn from its mistakes, an examination of the record
shows.”).
41.
Knutson, supra note 1.
42.
Id.
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The expert commission appointed by President Obama to investigate
the spill resisted strong oil industry pressure43 to brand BP a “rogue” company, concluding:
The blowout was not the product of . . . aberrational decisions
made by rogue industry or government officials . . . . [T]he root
causes are systemic and, absent significant reform . . . might well
recur. The missteps were rooted in systemic failures by industry
management (extending beyond BP to contractors that serve many
in the industry), and also by failures of government to provide effective regulatory oversight . . . .44
Regulatory failure included the grave mistake of housing the Department
of the Interior’s (DOI) entrepreneurial oil leasing program in the same
office as the skeletal regulatory staff of the Minerals Management Service
(MMS), which was responsible for policing the safety of offshore platforms
and rigs.45 The employees who worked in the leasing unit had a perverse
relationship with oil industry executives that included drunken parties and
sexual liaisons.46 This blatant corruption created an atmosphere where
aggressive regulation of deepwater safety by staff on the other side of the
office was systematically undermined. Even after the advent of the spill, the
Obama administration’s response was to divide the two offices into separate
divisions for leasing and regulatory oversight, but to leave them reporting
to the same boss: DOI Secretary Kenneth Salazar.47 Significant increases in
funding to support adequate inspections has not been forthcoming; as of
June 2011, seventy-nine inspectors were trying to cover all of the site visits
to some 3,500 rigs and platforms.48 The extraordinarily difficult task of
43.
See, e.g., John M. Broder, Oil Executives Break Ranks in Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2010, at A20 (“The chairmen of four of the world’s largest oil companies broke their
nearly two-month silence on the major spill in the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday and publicly
blamed BP for mishandling the well that caused the disaster.”).
44.
NAT’L COMM’N ON DEEPWATER HORIZON, supra note 29, at 122.
45.
Id. at 55; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Swears-In Michael R.
Bromwich to Lead Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(June 21, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-SwearsIn-Michael-R-Bromwich-to-Lead-Bureau-of-Ocean-Energy-Management-Regulation-andEnforcement-Secretarial-Order-begins-reorganization-of-former-mms.cfm.
46.
See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Minerals Service Had a Mandate to Produce Results, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A1 (“The causes of the spill remain unclear, but a number of the
agency’s actions have drawn fire . . . . The story has gained a bacchanal gloss because agency
employees in Louisiana and Colorado took meals, gifts and sporting trips paid for by the
industry, and several Colorado officials had sex and used drugs with industry employees.”).
47.
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 45.
48.
Ben Geman, Interior Beefs Up Offshore Inspections with Multiperson Teams, HILL
BLOG (June 13, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/166105interior-beefs-up-offshore-inspections-with-multi-person-teams.
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conducting meaningful inspections is made even more challenging by the
fact that these facilities are located many miles offshore.49 Investigative
reporting by the Wall Street Journal noted that a “small cadre” of inspectors
armed with “checklists and pencils” had failed to make much of a dent in
overseeing offshore operations throughout the Gulf:
[T]hese inspectors have been overruled by industry, undermined by
their own managers, and outmatched by the sheer number of offshore
installations they oversee. Inspectors come into the job with little
or no hands-on experience in deep-water drilling, learning as they
go.
[They] are largely checking hardware [and] get good marks for
reducing workplace injuries on rigs and platforms. But safety experts
say the main causes of major accidents are almost always human
error, not the mechanical failures that inspectors focus on. Inspectors
aren’t looking for signs of systemic safety problems—poor decisions, cutting corners, muddled responsibilities—that investigators
are linking to the Deepwater Horizon explosion . . . .
No one knows if a more robust and sophisticated inspection program could have detected [the problems that caused the Deepwater
Horizon] explosion. But there is broad agreement among safety
experts that a massive overhaul is needed to create the kind of
inspection program that can help avoid such disasters in the
future.50

3. Underground Mining Hazards
The same month as the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the worst mine
disaster in forty years killed twenty-nine men in Montcoal, West Virginia
at the Upper Big Branch facility owned by Massey Energy, a perennial
violator of mine safety laws.51 The accident was caused by a buildup of
methane gas that exploded, causing shafts a thousand feet deep to collapse.52
The Department of Justice charged the mine’s security chief with two
felonies for making false statements and obstructing justice, and President
Obama said, “We cannot bring back the men we lost. What we can do, in

49.
See Leslie Eaton et al., Inspectors Adrift in Rig-Safety Push, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
2010, at A1.
50.
Id.
51.
Urbina, supra note 1.
52.
See, e.g., Mufson et al., supra note 21.
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their memory, is thoroughly investigate this tragedy and demand accountability.”53
In the spring of 2010, a team led by J. Davitt McAteer, who headed
MSHA under President Clinton, reported to the Governor of West Virginia
on the causes of the Big Branch tragedy.54 Like the reports on BP’s track
record before the Deepwater Horizon spill, the investigation revealed that
MSHA inspectors had previously discovered serious violations in the systems that failed spectacularly during the Big Branch explosion, including
incidents involving the accumulation of explosive methane gas, the malfunctioning of required ventilation systems, and the failure to clear coal
dust from active mineshafts in order to prevent it from becoming a firespreading fuel during an explosion.55 The inspectors issued routine citations
against the company, but did not manage to use their ample enforcement
authority with enough force to deter the continuation of these lifethreatening conditions.56 This passivity is made all the more remarkable by
the fact that Massey Energy had the worst fatality record in the country:
during the period from 2000 to 2010, fifty-four of its miners died on the
job.57
A little over a year after the Big Branch tragedy, MSHA undertook a
surprise inspection at another Massey mine in West Virginia.58 The inspectors discovered two dozen safety violations that could trigger fires and
explosions and ordered the evacuation of all miners from threatened portions of the facility.59 “The conduct and behavior exhibited when we caught
the mine operator by surprise is nothing short of outrageous,” said MSHA
head Joe Main.60 Meanwhile, the Los Angeles Times reported about a week
later, the agency was making little progress on a backlog of nineteen thousand pending appeals of citations for safety violations filed by mining
53.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Upper Big Branch Security Chief Charged with
Additional Count of Making False Statement to MSHA Investigative Team (May 17, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/wvs/press_releases/May%202011/51711Stover%20
press%20release.pdf (charging Hughie Stover, Chief of Security at Upper Big Branch, with a
third charge in addition to two felony charges resulting from an investigation of the explosion); Press Release, The White House, Statement by President Obama on the Big Branch
Mine (Apr. 10, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statementpresident-obama-upper-big-branch-mine.
54.
J. DAVITT MCATEER, ET AL., UPPER BIG BRANCH (2011), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/20/us/20110520_MINE_REPORT_DOC.html.
55.
Id. at 16.
56.
Id. at 82–84.
57.
Id. at 93.
58.
Howard Berkes, Serious Safety Lapses Shut Down Parts of Massey Coal Mine,
NPR BLOG (May 3, 2011, 10:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/05/04/
135972287/serious-safety-lapses-shut-down-parts-of-massey-coal-mine.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
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companies.61 A provision in the law allows companies to avoid penalties
that might motivate more diligent compliance while their appeals are pending.62 MSHA’s inability to process those appeals further undermines its
effectiveness.
The Massey Energy example drives home the reality that federal regulators have gotten to the point that they cannot effectively cope with
chronic and egregious violations by companies that regard the regulatory
system with disdain, even after catastrophes that should put an end to such
lethargy.

4. Coal Ash Dumps
In the early morning hours of December 22, 2008, an earthen dam
holding back an eighty-acre “surface impoundment” (the technocratic
euphemism for a water-logged dump dug into the ground) at a Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) power plant broke, releasing 1.1 billion gallons of
inky coal ash sludge across Kingston, Tennessee and neighboring towns.63
The flood crossed a river, damaging more than one hundred homes and
infiltrating several streams that bisected the area, ultimately covering three
hundred acres in four to five feet of sludge and mud. Miraculously, no one
was killed. In the aftermath of the disaster, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson promised to re-evaluate the agency’s decades-old reluctance to regulate
the disposal of some 144 million tons of coal ash generated annually, vowing
to issue her conclusions within a year.64 Jackson met this deadline, but her
efforts were derailed when an intensive industry lobbying campaign provoked OIRA to rewrite the EPA proposal, adding two significantly weaker
options and derailing the momentum of the rule: it will not see the light of
day until later this year, at the earliest.65
Several highly toxic constituents are present in trace amounts in coal,
including cadmium, chromium, lead, and mercury; burning the fuel
concentrates these contaminants in the ash left after combustion.66 When
61.
Geiger et al., supra note 24.
62.
Id.
63.
Samira Simone, Tennessee Slude Spill Runs Over Homes, Water, CNN (Dec. 23,
2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-12-23/us/tennessee.sludge.spill_1_kingston-fossil-plantsludge-coal-plant?_s=PM:US; Stephanie Smith, Months After Ash Spill, Tennessee Town Still
Choking, CNN (July 13, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-07-13/health/coal.ash.illnesses_
1_coal-ash-drinking-water-coal-power-plant?_s=PM:HEALTH; Toxic Tsunami, NEWSWEEK
(July 18, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2009/07/17/toxic-tsunami.html.
64.
Simone, supra note 63; Smith, supra note 63; Toxic Tsunami, supra note 63.
65.
James Goodwin, The Delays Get Delayier: The Sad First Year of EPA’s Coal Ash
Proposal, CPR BLOG (May 4, 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?
idBlog=BB2B286A-9713-BCF4-C74CD4C1151572A8.
66.
Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of
Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed.
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coal ash is disposed in leaking dumps, these materials migrate into soil and
water, threatening people and wildlife.67
The threat of another catastrophe along the lines of the Kingston spill
is particularly acute for surface impoundments: some 186 of the 584 such
facilities estimated to be operating in the U.S. were not designed by a
professional engineer; 56 impoundments are older than fifty years, 96 are
older than forty years, and 340 are somewhere between twenty-six and
forty years old.68 EPA has characterized forty-nine coal ash dump sites in
several different states as having high hazard potential, including the Little
Blue Run ash basin in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, which is thirty times
larger than the Kingston facility.69
Unless and until a protective federal rule goes into effect, regulation of
coal ash disposal sites will remain the province of the states, which have a
checkered track record on controlling leakage and preventing spills. State
environmental agencies vary widely in the resources they have available and
the stringency of the regulations they have adopted to supplement the floor
of federal requirements. So, for example, a federal government study found
that in the eleven states where coal-fired power plants produce half the ash
generated nationwide, approximately thirty percent of such waste is potentially exempt from regulation.70

5. Tainted Food
In the
salmonella
commence
interviews

fall of 2008, a high number of illnesses and deaths caused by
poisoning71 alerted Minnesota health officials that they should
a “trace-back” study, an arduous process that involves detailed
with people who have become ill to discover common food

Reg. 35,128, 35,153 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264,
265, 268, 271, 302).
67.
Id. EPA estimated that in 2004 31% of landfills and 62% of surface impoundments
devoted to coal ash disposal lacked liners to contain hazardous constituents from leaching
into underground aquifers, while 10% of such landfills and 58% of such impoundments did
not have any system for monitoring leaks. Id. at 35,151.
68.
Id. at 35,153.
69.
See, e.g., Brian Bowling, ‘High Hazard’ Ash Basin in Beaver County Called Safe,
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (Dec. 25, 2008), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/
news/regional/s_604497.html; Fact Sheet: Coal Combustion Residues (CCR)-Surface Impoundments with High Hazard Potential Ratings, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/waste/nonhaz/industrial/
special/fossil/ccrs-fs/index.htm (last updated Aug. 2009).
70.
Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at
35,151.
71.
For a description of these events, see The Salmonella Outbreak: The Continued
Failure to Protect the Food Supply: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter The Salmonella
Hearings]; Rena Steinzor, High Crimes, Not Misdemeanors: Deterring the Production of Unsafe
Food, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 175, 176 (2010).
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sources.72 Public health graduate students who worked for the state parttime and were jokingly called the “Diarrhea Squad”73 discovered that
peanut products supplied to schools, nursing homes, and other institutions
and manufactured by the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) were the
culprits.74 The paste, which was used in more than 2,000 categories of
products, ultimately killed nine and sickened thousands.75
PCA had two processing plants: one in Blakely, Georgia and a second
in Plainview, Texas. Investigations by the media and congressional overseers
determined that the Blakely plant operators knowingly shipped the contaminated products to their customers after the paste had tested positive for
salmonella.76 The Texas plant operated without a required state license and
had not been inspected by state officials for nearly four years.77 The Georgia plant was awash in outright safety violations and bad management
practices, including a leaking roof, mold growing on ceilings and walls,
rodent infestation, filthy nut processing receptacles, feathers and feces in its
air filtration system, and a broken roaster used to sterilize the peanuts
before they were ground into paste.78
Georgia state inspectors, who were contracted to inspect their state’s
food processors by the FDA, visited the plant multiple times from 2006–08
without forcing a halt to these practices.79 Both plants closed, the company
72.
For a description of this methodology, see The Salmonella Hearings, supra note 71,
at 2–3 (statement of Stephen F. Sundlof, Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at the Food and Drug Administration).
73.
I’m A Pepper, You’re A Pepper, He’s A Pepper Too, KAVIPS (July 31, 2008), http://
kavips.wordpress.com/2008/07/31/im-a-pepper-youre-a-pepper-hes-a-pepper-too/.
74.
The Salmonella Hearings, supra note 71, at 3–5.
75.
Andrew Martin, Troubled Peanut Company Files for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at B2 (citing data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention tying 637 illnesses and nine deaths to the salmonella outbreak); see also Elizabeth Weise
& Julie Schmit, Health Risks May Reach Far Beyond Reported Victims, USA TODAY, Feb. 10,
2009, at 1A (“The conventional wisdom among epidemiologists . . . is that for each case of
salmonellosis that is reported, more than 38 other people get sick but don’t go to their
doctor or get tested.”).
76.
The Salmonella Hearings, supra note 71, at 7 (statement of Stephen F. Sundlof,
Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at the Food and Drug Administration); see also Gardiner Harris, Peanut Product Recall Grows in Salmonella Scare, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A15 (reporting that salmonella contamination was a chronic problem at the plant).
77.
Gardiner Harris, After Tests, Peanut Plant in Texas Is Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2009, at A14 (reporting on the closure of the Texas plant and interviews with its former
employees who said it was “disgusting” and shared many of the problems reported about the
Georgia plant); Martin, supra note 75.
78.
Inspectional Observations of Peanut Corporation of America, U.S. FDA (Feb. 4,
2009), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ORA/ORAElectronicReading
Room/UCM109834.pdf; Martin, supra note 75.
79.
Lyndsey Layton, Every Peanut Product from Ga. Plant Recalled, WASH. POST, Jan.
29, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Georgia inspectors consistently played down deficiencies);
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declared bankruptcy, and FDA officials opened a criminal investigation.80
Two years later, PCA’s chief executive officer was discovered serving as a
consultant to the peanut industry.81 As mentioned earlier, a lame-duck
Democratic-controlled Congress did manage to pass legislation strengthening
the FDA’s regulatory authority over the domestic food industry, but House
Republicans almost immediately launched efforts to defund these programs.82

6. Dangerous Imports
During 2007, manufacturers and retailers agreed to recall millions of
toys from store shelves and homes following the discovery that these Chinese imports were coated with lead paint;83 paint made with lead is two
thirds cheaper in China than the safe variety.84 Toy industry experts predicted that such large, attention-grabbing recalls would continue.85 After
all, an astounding eighty percent of toys sold in America are manufactured
in China, which has no effective regulatory systems.86 Chinese executives
admitted that their government does not inspect factories and that, alt-

Roni Caryn Rabin, Peanut Plant Had History of Health Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at
A23 (reporting that state inspectors found areas of rust that could flake into food, gaps in
warehouse doors big enough for rodents to get through, unmarked spray bottles and containers, and numerous other violations without taking effective action to compel the
company to correct these conditions).
80.
Rob Stein, FDA Investigating Peanut Company Behind Recall, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
2009, at A2; Martin, supra note 75.
81.
Mary Clark Jalonick, Back to Work After Salmonella Case, ABC NEWS (Sept. 8,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=11580976.
82.
Lyndsey Layton, House Republicans Vote to Cut Millions from Food Safety Funds,
WASH. POST, June 16, 2011, at A5 (“Rep. Jack Kingston (R-Ga.), chairman of the House
subcommittee that wrote the agriculture appropriations bill, said the cuts to food safety were
justified because the nation’s food supply was ‘99.99 percent safe.’ ”).
83.
Coglianese et al., supra note 1, at 3.
84.
See, e.g., David Barboza, Why Lead in Toy Paint? It’s Cheaper, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2007, at C1; China Signs Pact to Ban Lead Paint in Export Toys, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at
C9.
85.
“ ‘If I went down the shelves of Wal-Mart and tested everything, I’m going to find
serious problems,’ ” said Sean McGowan, a toy industry investment expert. Louise Story &
David Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys Sent from China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at
A1. “ ‘The idea that Mattel—with its high standards—has a bigger problem than everybody
else is laughable. If we don’t see an increase of recalls in this industry, then it’s a case of
denial.’ ” Id.
86.
Barboza, supra note 84; Andrew Martin, More Ripples from Chinese Product Troubles,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at C1. For a general discussion of environmental conditions in
China and the inadequacy—indeed, the virtual absence—of effective regulation, see
ALEXANDRA HARNEY, THE CHINA PRICE: THE TRUE COST OF CHINESE COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE (2008).
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hough a national standard theoretically limits lead levels in consumer
products, no one enforces it.87
Few subsequent recalls have occurred in the United States, raising the
specter that ongoing problems have overwhelmed CPSC, the smallest and
most dysfunctional of the protector agencies.88 The agency has a miniscule
annual budget of $105 million despite its responsibility to oversee the safety
of some fifteen thousand categories of dangerously defective products. This
scant amount supports approximately 483 Full Time Equivalent employees
(FTEs),89 in contrast to the 891 FTEs it had on staff in FY 1981. The
American population increased by thirty-six percent during that same period.90
In a similar but more recent episode, sulfur-infused drywall—once
again imported from China—was installed in thousands of homes throughout the Southeast.91 Fumes from the poisoned product corroded pipes and
wiring, ruined new appliances, and caused headaches and severe respiratory
illness for homeowners and other occupants.92 The problem received widespread media attention, especially in the South, where hot, humid weather
exacerbated the release of fumes. CPSC has no authority to force Chinese
manufacturers to recall the defective drywall and has not even managed
to determine the origin or extent of the problem.93 When consumers
complained that the problem was also present in drywall manufactured in
the United States, CPSC was further embarrassed when it launched an
investigation of conditions in eleven homes, concluding that five suffered
from the drywall sulfur problem, but declaring that it was unable to determine the origin of the offending drywall because it lacked the resources to
87.
Barboza, supra note 84.
88.
The CPSC website lists recalls chronologically, reciting the reason for the recall
and the country of manufacture. See U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, Toy Hazard
Recalls, http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/category/toy.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2011).
Since 2007, a handful of recalls have occurred because of lead paint. Id.
89.
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, supra note 7, at vi.
90.
In 1980, the midyear population in the U.S. was 227.2 million. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, International Data Base, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php (last
updated June 2010). By 2010 the population had increased to 308.7 million people. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010 (2011), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf.
91.
Joaquin Sapien & Aaron Kessler, Federal Probe of Chinese Drywall Falls Short,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Dec. 15, 2010, at A1.
92.
See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 1; $2.6m Awarded over Corrosive Drywall, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2010, at A2 (“Thousands of homeowners—mostly in Florida, Virginia,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana—have reported problems with the drywall, which was
imported in large quantities during the housing boom and after a string of Gulf Coast
hurricanes.”).
93.
Sapien & Kessler, supra note 91 (reporting that the “federal government is woefully unequipped to help them with a product defect as expensive and widespread as this one”).
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complete the investigation.94 The drywall problem will be left to the tort
system to resolve, turning the clock back to the days before CPSC and its
sister agencies were created to prevent such injuries.

7. Refinery Explosions
In what should have been a wake-up call for BP’s top managers, a 2005
explosion killed fifteen at the third-largest refinery in the country, located
in Texas City, Texas.95 The accident was preceded by numerous warnings
from company consultants and managers that fatal accidents were the inevitable consequence of relentless cost cutting.96 OSHA assessed a fine of $21
million, one of the largest in the agency’s history. 97 But the company
ignored the provisions of the consent decree requiring it to make changes
to the facility’s operations, triggering a subsequent $50 million fine for
repeat violations.98
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) filed
an “investigation report” on the Texas City incident, evaluating OSHA’s
role in the disaster.99 It found that the agency had conducted several inspections at the plant, primarily in response to other fatalities, but that it never
identified the likelihood of such a “catastrophic incident.”100 This omission
is especially surprising because the agency discovered “301 egregious
willful [sic] violations” in the immediate aftermath of the explosion at the
processing unit that was the origin of the blast.101 Equally incredible, two
years after the Texas City incident OSHA still had not conducted “a
comprehensive inspection of any of the other 29 process units at the Texas
City refinery.”102

94.
Joaquin Sapien, CPSC Report on U.S.-Made Drywall Raises More Questions Than
Answers, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 21, 2011, 2:48 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/cpscreport-on-u.s.-made-drywall-raises-more-questions-than-answers-110421/single.
95.
Knutson, supra note 1.
96.
Id. (reporting that “[n]ew managers who arrived at the refinery were often
shocked by the state of the facility” and that Don Parus, the plant manager who took over
the plant in 2002, became so desperate that in 2004 he showed BP executives pictures of
workers who had died at the plant, pleading for no more cost cutting); Don Parus’ Powerpoint
Presentation, document acquired for The Spill, FRONTLINE (2004), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/bp-troubled-past/don-parus-powerpoint.html.
97.
See, e.g., Marian Wang, BP Agrees to Pay $50 Million for Earlier Texas City Problems,
PROPUBLICA BLOG (Aug. 12, 2010, 4:32 PM), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/bpagrees-to-pay-50-million-for-earlier-texas-city-problems.
98.
Id.
99.
U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., INVESTIGATION REPORT:
REFINERY EXPLOSION AND FIRE, REPORT NO. 2005-04-1-TX (2007).
100.
Id. at 20.
101.
Id. at 20.
102.
Id. at 20.
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The CSB further concluded that OSHA’s approach to refinery safety
fell far short of the standards set by other enforcement agencies, including
state-run programs in Nevada and California, as well as Britain’s Health
and Safety Executive.103 It estimated that about fifteen thousand facilities
engage in sufficiently high hazard industrial processes to have a comparable
potential for a catastrophic incident, but that OSHA only had one small
team of inspectors competent to discover violations and issue corrective
orders at such locations.104 Just as the CSB warned might happen, in April
2010 seven died in an accident at a Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washington.105

C. Root Causes
Dysfunction is a phenomenon that feeds rapaciously on itself, especially in periods when deregulatory campaigns are waxing. The worse the
agencies do, the more impassioned the condemnation meted out by their
critics at both ends of the political spectrum becomes. Paradoxically, health,
safety, and environmental agencies responsible for policing increasingly
hazardous activities have seen budgeting that, in constant dollars, has been
flat for three decades.106 The more their performance degenerates, the more
they are abused. During crises, these destructive trends are intensified as,
for example, when President Obama’s sharpest critics immediately pronounced the Gulf spill his “Hurricane Katrina.”107
Five root causes rise above all the others as synergistic factors that
accelerate agency dysfunction: (1) severe funding shortfalls that cripple any
103.
Id. at 204–05.
104.
Id. at 204, 207.
105.
Aaron Clark & Jessica Resnick-Ault, Tesoro Blast Shows Pattern of Refinery Safety
Problems, Investigator Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2010, 7:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-04-02/tesoro-blast-shows-pattern-of-refinery-safety-problems-investigator-says.html
(“The accident ‘appears to have the most fatalities of any accident since BP Texas City,’
Daniel Horowitz, a spokesman for the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board said. . . . The board is extremely concerned about the pattern of safety problems in
the refining sector.’ ”); see also News Release, Wash. State Dep’t. of Labor & Indus., L&I
Focus on Petroleum Refinery Safety Finds Multiple Violations at Tesoro (Apr. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.lni.wa.gov/news/2009/pr090415a.asp (reporting that one year before
the fatal explosion at the Anacortes facility, state regulators cited the company for seventeen
“serious” safety and health violations, where “serious” was defined as having the potential to
result in “death or serious physical injury”); Phuong Le, Tesoro Refinery Fined $2.39M in
Blast, NEWS TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:48 AM), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2010/10/05/
1369085/refinery-fined-239m-in-blast.html.
106.
See, e.g., RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE
BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND
THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54–71 (2010).
107.
Mimi Hall et al., Is Oil Spill Becoming Obama’s Katrina?, USA TODAY, May 27,
2010, at A1.
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reasonable efforts to fulfill statutory mandates; (2) outmoded legal authority
that leaves the agencies without the tools they need to deter irresponsible
corporate behavior; (3) political opportunism and bureaucracy bashing that
erodes their credibility and morale; (4) a crisis within the civil service as
mid-level and senior career managers retire and recruitment of talented
replacements from the private sector becomes ever more difficult; and
(5) in a few discrete but notable instances, outright capture of agency personnel by the industries they regulate.

1. Funding Shortfalls
Most of the protector agencies are funded by general taxpayer revenues. The two exceptions are the NRC, which receives ninety percent of its
funding from licensing fees,108 and the FDA, which gains significant support for its drug approval109 and food safety110 programs from industry fees.
Fee-based funding is more likely to produce stability for the agencies in
difficult economic times because it is immune from the deficit mania
embraced by both political parties.
Agencies funded by general taxpayer revenue have experienced steady
declines in available resources since the mid-1980s, when the severe Reagan
administration budget cuts took hold.111 In constant dollars, their fiscal
resources now stand at roughly the same levels as they did at that time,
despite the steady growth of the U.S. population and economy, the advent
of globalization, and the expansion of such high-risk activities as deepwater
oil production.112
In addition to deficit mania and indiscriminate attacks on big government as an evil in and of itself, another reason why these problems persist
is the bravado of political appointees. Once the President has finalized his
budget, his political appointees support it whether or not they are satisfied
with the resources allotted for their work. Agency heads also appear unwilling to admit that their agencies labor under the constraints of scant
108.
License Fees, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/licensing/fees.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2011).
109.
See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
110.
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
111.
The Reagan administration accomplished sharp cuts in certain aspects of domestic
spending, including the funding for protector agencies, but managed to amass a huge deficit
by increasing spending in other areas, such as defense, while simultaneously reducing taxpayer support. See, e.g, KENNETH JANDA ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY:
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN A GLOBAL WORLD 564–65 (10th ed. 2009) (“Although [it]
reduced inflation and unemployment . . . and worked largely as expected in the area of
industry deregulation, Reaganomics failed massively to reduce the budget deficit . . . .”).
112.
For a detailed analysis of these historical trends, see STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra
note 106, at 54–71.
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funding. Whining about money and its effect on their performance would
almost certainly earn the enmity of White House staffs that embrace the
philosophy of never letting anyone see the President—or his team—sweat.
These realities are increasingly unfortunate because one of the only ways to
shift the entrenched dynamic of under-funding is for experienced federal
managers to explain its implications to Congress, the White House, and the
public.

2. Inadequate Legal Authority
Employers who “willfully” disregard safety standards, with the result
that workers are killed on the job, face a maximum prison term of six
months, while tourists who “harass” a wild burro or horse in a national park
face up to one year in jail.113 Up until 2010, the FDA was compelled to coax
food processors to undertake recalls voluntarily because it lacked authority
to order the remedy.114 The Clean Water Act does not provide EPA with
the authority to regulate rain-induced runoff from pesticide and fertilizersoaked fields even though these heavily contaminated discharges degrade
water quality in many locations.115
Like traditional police departments, the protector agencies lack the
resources to inspect every regulated facility on a routine basis, and must
instead rely on a relatively small number of high-profile prosecutions to
deter violations by similarly situated companies.116 Dwindling resources
make such prosecutions difficult to pursue and, as the MSHA backlog of
nineteen thousand appeals illustrates, companies take full advantage of
legal loopholes and other opportunities to slow prosecutions down.117 As
enforcement falters, companies realize that it makes more economic sense
to ignore legal requirements that will compel expensive capital investments—for example, the installation of pollution control equipment—and
113.
Compare Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-195,
§ 8, 85 Stat. 649, 650–51 (justifying the penalty on the grounds that “Congress finds and
declares that wild free-roaming horses and burros are living symbols of the historic and
pioneer spirit of the West”), with Occupational Safety and Health Act § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666
(2006).
114.
See, e.g., Background on the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/ucm239907.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2011).
115.
See, e.g., Nonpoint Source: Introduction, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/
nonpoin1.cfm (last updated Nov. 24, 2009) (“The Act’s enforceable provisions are directed
at discharges from point sources—regulating the discharge of pollutants to surface waters
from pipes, outlets, and other discrete conveyances . . . . Yet water pollution from nonpoint
sources remains a substantial contributor to the impairment of waters across the nation.”).
116.
For an excellent discussion of deterrence-based enforcement, see Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
117.
Geiger et al., supra note 24.
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run the risk of discovery. Even when caught, the penalties they must pay
may not cost nearly as much as the original, avoided investment.

3. Political Abuse, Interference, and Neglect
Congress is a fickle mistress, quick to defund and even quicker to
blame the bureaucracy when lack of resources undermines its capacity to
prevent regulatory failures. Bureaucrats are often first at hand for wellpublicized ridicule by congressional committees when anything goes wrong,
as well as when agencies attempt to issue stronger requirements to prevent
such disasters. Although it is difficult to imagine, matters have not improved
much since former Republican Majority Leader Tom Delay compared EPA
to the Nazi Gestapo on the House floor.118 Today, House Republican leaders warn the EPA Administrator that they “are reserving a parking space
for her because she’ll have to make frequent stops to justify her every
move.”119
One other aspect of the problem deserves mention. President Obama’s
administration has been characterized by the appointment of several highlevel “czars,” including Carol Browner, the Clinton-era EPA Administrator
who preferred to work within the White House instead of asking for her
old job back. Assigned the ambiguous portfolio of trouble shooting on
“energy and environment,” Browner was featured in an early story in the
New York Times introducing the President’s “inner circle,” with the implication that she was more powerful than EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson.120
This divided authority did little to assuage poor morale at EPA or other
protector agencies. Browner ultimately resigned from her position and has
not yet been replaced, a positive development for Jackson amongst a tide of
negative ones.121
The effect of a countervailing White House center of power on Jackson’s credibility and authority is especially important because EPA has
served as the favorite target for deregulatory movements since it was
created in 1970.122 Beyond diluting their influence through White House
118.
Bruce Burkhard, Year in Review: Congress vs. Environment: Environmental Laws
Suffer Under GOP-Controlled Congress, CNN (Dec. 29, 1995, 12:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
EARTH/9512/congress_enviro/.
119.
Tom Moran, Editorial, EPA Chief Lisa Jackson Braces for Battle with Congress over
Climate Change Regulations, STAR-LEDGERBLOG (Dec. 12, 2010, 5:55 AM), http://blog.
nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2010/12/epa_chief_lisa_jackson_braces.html.
120.
Matthew L. Wald, Obama’s Inner Circle, Members and Maybes: Carol M. Browner,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, at A15.
121.
Moran, supra note 119; Bryan Walsh, Politics: The Republican War on the EPA
Begins—But Will They Overreach?, TIME ECOCENTRIC BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011, 5:14 PM), http://
ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2011/02/09/politics-the-republican-war-on-the-epa-begins%E2%
80%94but-will-they-overreach/.
122.
See infra Part II.
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czars—the OIRA Administrator is typically referred to as the “regulatory
czar” by reporters123—it is also difficult to think of a single instance where a
President affirmatively and publicly defended an EPA Administrator in
times of trouble, sending a potent message that the agency must go it alone
when under fire.
With one notable exception, commentators who support centralized review not only are untroubled by its use to suppress proactive regulation, but
they also extol the idea that the President must be the ultimate backstop for
unduly enthusiastic bureaucracies.124 But in an article entitled Presidential
Administration, then-professor and now-Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan
argues that the potential for presidential support for an agency’s affirmative
agenda is a strong argument favoring centralization.125 She explains that
President Clinton adopted the agenda of FDA Commissioner David Kessler
to intensify the battle against teen smoking, arguing that this episode illustrates how a more supportive version of unitary executive oversight could
give agencies tremendous credibility.126 This point is true as far as it goes,
which is far enough to provide a model of behavior for other Presidents but
not nearly far enough to justify the elaborate system of centralized White
House review now in operation. For one thing, it is difficult to think of
another comparable example of such sustained presidential support. For
another, Kessler’s initiative was decimated by the Supreme Court in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., which concluded that the agency needed
congressional authorization to expand its jurisdiction in this matter.127 In
any event, the use of executive power to support agencies on important
issues can occur whether or not the White House pursues centralized regulatory review through OIRA.

4. Civil Service Brain Drain
Political scientist Frances Rourke once wrote:
The fact that government agencies are having trouble doing their
work has never been of serious concern in American democracy.
After all, constitutional arrangements in the United States were
not designed to smooth the way for the exercise of power by the
instrumentalities of the state. No amount of antibureaucratic rhet123.
See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman & Jess Bravin, Obama’s Regulatory Czar Likely to Set a
New Tone, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123138051682263203.html.
124.
See, e.g., Croley, supra note 14; DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14; Graham et al.,
supra note 14; Hahn & Litan, supra note 14.
125.
See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2282–84.
126.
Id.
127.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
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oric, however, can obscure the fact that effective national policymaking in the United States, as in other democracies, requires that
the elected officials responsible for making policy decisions receive
as much help as possible from the permanent
organizations of government.128
Rourke reminds us that the nation’s anxiety about autocratic, distant government is so deeply rooted that the civil service should never harbor the
expectation of applause or acceptance.129 Nevertheless, the erosion of the
civil service in recent years is arguably the worst manifestation of public
distrust since the difficult transition from patronage to professionalism at
the turn of the last century.130 A series of blue ribbon commissions and
analysis by political scientists have concluded that civil servants—especially
those that hold mid-level management positions—are beleaguered by hostile
congressional oversight, limited positive reinforcement, funding gaps, and
disparities in public and private pay scales for those with specialized technical, administrative, and legal expertise.131 Consider the alarmist tone of
the 2003 National Commission on the Public Service, more commonly
known as the Volcker Commission because its chairman was Paul Volcker, a
former head of the Federal Reserve:
The notion of public service, once a noble calling proudly pursued by the most talented Americans of every generation, draws
an indifferent response from today’s young people and repels many
of the country’s leading private citizens. Those with policy
responsibility find their decisionmaking frustrated by overlapping
jurisdictions, competing special interests, and sluggish administrative response . . . . The best are underpaid; the worst, overpaid.
Too many of the most talented leave the public service too early;
too many of the least talented stay too long.132
128.
Frances E. Rourke, American Bureaucracy in a Changing Political Setting, 1 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 111, 111 (1991).
129.
Id. at 118–19.
130.
For an analysis of this process, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 14–36 (2001).
131.
For a more detailed description of these issues, see STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra
note 106, at 192–219.
132.
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERVICE, URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA:
REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at 1 (2003). Other
members of the Volcker Commission included former Comptroller General Charles Bowsher; former Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ); former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci;
former Reagan administration Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein; former Director of
Presidential Personnel Constance Horner; former OMB Director Franklin Raines; CoChair of the Millennial Housing Commission Richard Ravitch; former Secretary of the
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According to 2008 estimates by the non-partisan Partnership for the Public
Service, the federal government will lose nearly 530,000 employees by
2012, largely because it has a workforce aging far faster than that of the
private sector—58% of federal workers are over forty-five, compared with
41% in the private sector.133 The Partnership projects that 36% of top civil
service managers in the Senior Executive Service (SES) will retire by
2012.134 Similarly, 27% of supervisors who direct daily work throughout the
government are expected to retire by 2012.135 While most of these retirements are motivated by length of service, morale problems are also acute:
Far too many talented public servants are abandoning the middle
levels of government . . . either because they are fed up with the
constraints of outmoded personnel systems and unmet expectations for advancement or simply lured away by the substantial
difference between public and private sector salaries in many
areas.136
The implications of this “brain drain” are compounded by the fact that
downsizing throughout the 1990s reduced the size of the federal workforce
by 400,000 jobs, leaving many crucial positions unfilled.137 Moreover, even
these discouraging predictions do not account for the deep budget cuts
across the government that seem certain to occur as a result of deficit politics
in Congress. The loss of experienced managers and attrition in important,
lower-level positions could undermine the agencies further, making it difficult to avoid acute dysfunction.

5. Capture
Capture, in the traditional sense of the term, is less prominent than
early administrative law scholars supposed.138 Agencies suffer from resource
shortfalls, outside political interference, demoralization, and incompetence
far more often than they succumb to the corruption of being beholden to
only one group of stakeholders. The irony is that some of the remedies
thought necessary to defeat capture—extensive judicial review, for example—
Treasury Robert Rubin; former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala;
and former Representative Vin Weber (R-MN).
133.
Issue Brief: Brain Drain 2008, P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. (May 5, 2008), http://www.
ourpublicservice.org/OPS/publications/viewcontentdetails.php?id=126.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERVICE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 8.
137.
Issue Brief: Brain Drain 2008, supra note 133.
138.
For a classic discussion of the phenomenon, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY
INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981).
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have caused new problems, including extensive delays in issuing protective
regulation.139 Nevertheless, the most corrosive form of capture clearly a
ffected MMS, as discussed above in the context of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster.140 Clearly, capture remains a potential contributing factor to agency
dysfunction, especially when regulatory missions are combined with the
administration of lucrative leasing agreements for extractive industries.
Why has the Obama administration—and the George H. W. Bush,
Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations before it—failed to recognize, much less come to grips with, these blatant symptoms of dysfunction
and failure? A primary factor is OIRA, which serves both as the gatekeeper
for regulatory proposals to enter the outside world and a distorted window
through which the White House looks back at the agencies.

II. THE HISTORY OF CENTRALIZED REVIEW
Because President Ronald Reagan is widely credited with launching the
ongoing campaign against big government, casual observers of the regulatory
process assume that the idea of centralized White House review began with
his election. In fact, OIRA’s antecedents date further back to the same time
period in the early 1970s when the protector agencies were first created. This
historical detail is crucial to an understanding of how OIRA evolved and
why it became ever more powerful.
Environmentalists, organized labor, and consumer advocates played an
outside game through much of this history, using public sentiment and the
media to amplify pressure on Congress to create the agencies and steadily
expand their statutory missions. In the 1990s, such fertile legislative activity
for the most part ceased. Regulated industries responded with an inside
game, focusing on the White House staff and leveraging the perceived
electoral advantages of having business support to impress upon Presidents
the need to moderate, as quietly as possible, the public interest community’s
gains. Over the long run, the inside game appears to have been a far more
effective strategy because it has allowed Presidents to have their political
cake and eat it too: publicly supporting popular initiatives like environmental protection but placating business interests behind the scenes. Not
incidentally, public interest groups put their faith in Congress, an institution that has become increasingly dysfunctional over the years, while
business interests hedged their bets with the Presidency, which has become
steadily more powerful.
139.
See, e.g., CATHERINE O’NEILL ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE
HIDDEN HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF DELAY (2009), available at http://www.
progressivereform.org/articles/CostofDelay_907.pdf; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1429–36 (1992).
140.
DeParle, supra note 46.
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A. 1970–1980: “Quality of Life” Reviews
With the notable exception of the FDA,141 the most important health,
safety, and environmental agencies were created in the first flush of progressive idealism and social movements catalyzed by young people’s proprotests against the Vietnam War.142 The companies subject to this stunning
expansion of the regulatory state appeared to have been caught by surprise,
and they did not muster any effective opposition to the rapid-fire creation
of these new institutions. They recovered quickly, however, and the seeds of
centralized White House review controlled by political staff and economic
advisers at the highest levels were planted in the early days of the Nixon
administration when Maurice Stans, President Nixon’s Secretary of Commerce, persuaded chief domestic policy advisor John Ehrlichman to
establish a taskforce to oversee EPA’s regulatory activities.143
That taskforce, the National Industrial Pollution Control Council
(NIPCC), enthusiastically supported so-called “quality of life reviews”144 to
curb EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act of 1970.145 Established by
a 1970 executive order, NIPCC included sixty-three corporate executives
who were appointed by the Commerce Department Secretary.146 The
NIPCC’s purpose was to give potential regulatory targets an open line to
the top levels of government. Although modern regulatory review does not
incorporate such blatant efforts to involve business leaders as decision
makers, one of the lasting legacies of these early efforts is an unduly solicitous cultivation of industry complaints and opposition to regulatory

141.
The FDA was created in 1906 in response to the fraud that surrounded the marketing of ineffective and even dangerous remedies. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat.
768, repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059
(1938); JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE MEDICAL MESSIAHS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HEALTH
QUACKERY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 98 (1967).
142.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app.
at 643 (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing EPA); Consumer Product Safety
Act, Pub. L. No. 92–573, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2053(a) (2006)) (establishing CPSC); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91–596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006)) (establishing
OSHA); Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–605, § 202, 84 Stat. 1714, 1739 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 105 (2006)) (establishing NHTSA).
143.
See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 132–33 (1991).
144.
Id. at 130, 135.
145.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006)).
146.
Exec. Order No. 11,523, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1970); Percival, supra note 143, at 130.
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proposals spearheaded by OIRA, the “court of second resort” for such
aggrieved parties.147
From their inception, as Professor Robert Percival recounts, quality of
life reviews followed a second pattern that remains entrenched in regulatory review as practiced today: the inside game occurs simultaneously with
the outside game.148 William Ruckelshaus, EPA’s first Administrator and,
for the time, a committed environmentalist, pleaded his case for particularly controversial rules to the press and to sympathetic members of Congress,
including Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie, the presidential candidate
who is largely credited with having provoked Nixon into creating EPA by
executive order.149 This outside game was more than matched by regulated
industries’ inside game: quality of life reviews behind closed doors where
the outcomes of a rulemaking were negotiated by senior administration
officials in close collaboration with the NIPCC. Ruckelshaus and his successor, Russell Train, worked hard to put the best face on final EPA
decisions that clearly reflected major substantive retreats forced upon them
behind the scenes, arguing that OMB, by then the convener of such
reviews, did not dictate these outcomes.150 These protests did not reassure
public interest groups, who accused OMB of allowing regulated industries
to negate EPA’s best professional judgments.151
And so it went throughout the 1970s. President Gerald Ford retained
quality of life reviews, inspiring similar controversy on Capitol Hill and
among public interest groups.152 Ford also mandated a precursor of costbenefit analysis in the form of a requirement that agencies prepare
“inflation impact statements” to include discussion of the potential effect of
the proposed regulation on industry costs and therefore inflation throughout the economy as a whole.153 A new office within the White House, the
Council on Wage and Price Stability, “was given the responsibility of coordinating agency compliance” with this new requirement.154 The Council’s
147.
CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32397, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 27
(2009).
148.
Percival, supra note 143, at 134–38.
149.
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 643 (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing EPA). For a compelling
description of these events and the dynamic between Democratic presidential candidates
and President Nixon, see RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT,
MANAGING OURSELVES 227–54 (2d ed. 2006).
150.
See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Notso-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 988–89 (2001).
151.
Percival, supra note 143, at 136.
152.
Id. at 138–41.
153.
Id. at 139. The inflationary impact statement requirement was included in Exec.
Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971–1975).
154.
Percival, supra note 143, at 139.
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focus was on economic regulation, as opposed to health, safety, and environmental rules.155
Jimmy Carter’s inauguration as President in 1977 at first seemed to
signal a new day for EPA and other health and safety agencies.156 The
President did not officially repeal quality of life reviews, but the process
withered on the vine as newly-appointed EPA administrator John Quarles
announced that his staff would no longer participate in those deliberations.157 But when Carter nominated his old friend Bert Lance to serve as
OMB director, it rapidly became clear that a robust process of curbing
strong regulatory proposals within the White House would continue.158 On
March 23, 1978, President Carter issued the first executive order to mandate a comprehensive regulatory review program headquartered at OMB.159
Executive Order 12,044 directed that regulatory proposals should not impose “unnecessary” burdens on the economy and should be issued only after
consideration of “meaningful” alternatives.160 It also required the preparation of a “Regulatory Analysis” to accompany all rulemaking proposals and
final rules, as well as a semiannual regulatory agenda containing notice of
rules under development.161
The most notable characteristic of the new review process was the addition of yet another unusually potent set of players to the process.
In addition to the Council on Wage and Price Controls, the Council of
Economic Advisers, and OMB, the President set up an inter-agency group
called the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), which included
representatives of seventeen major federal agencies.162 RARG’s fourmember executive committee included representatives from the Council
of Economic Advisers and OMB, as well as two rotating members of the
larger agency group—one from an “economic agency” and one from a
“regulatory agency.” The executive committee was instructed to select some
twenty major regulations annually for intensive review.163
This process triggered significant controversy despite the fact that
it occurred in public and was supposedly designed to encourage the agencies themselves to learn the new methodologies rather than have OMB do
this work for them. Among other disputes, the RARG forced then-EPA
Administrator Douglas Costle to weaken a crucial standard that would set
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979).
Id. § 1, 1(d).
Id. § 2(a), 3.
Percival, supra note 143, at 144.
Id.
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the acceptable level of ozone (commonly known as smog) in the ambient
air.164 As we shall see, the George W. Bush administration and the Obama
administration saw reprises of this episode with the RARG’s successor,
OIRA, in charge.165
From a present-day perspective, however, the most significant feature
of the Carter process was that the agencies assigned the mission of preserving environmental quality, eliminating workplace health and safety threats,
or drumming defective products out of the marketplace took their place as
members of a much larger group, with no special recognition of their statutory mandates or their unique expertise. This aspect of regulatory review,
which undermines any internal government deference Congress intended to
assign to the protector agencies, is now a deeply entrenched and enormously
powerful tool used by White House staff when conducting centralized
review of individual rules.

B. 1980–1992: Executive Orders and Paperwork Review
At the close of the Carter administration, industry champions of
deregulation succeeded in getting two statutes passed to impose further
controls on the agencies: the Regulatory Flexibility Act166 and the Paperwork
Reduction Act.167 The second statute created OIRA. The new unit’s statutory mission was limited to reviewing any proposal by a government agency
or department to require the completion of additional paperwork by citizens, state or local government, or private sector entities.168 But OIRA’s far
more important role in reviewing the substance of regulations was soon
fleshed out in a series of executive orders.169 The first, Executive Order
12,291,170 issued by President Reagan within one month of taking office, had
three distinct mandates:

164.
Id. at 146. Known as National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and
authorized by section 109 of the Clean Air Act, attainment of such limits on smog remains a
distant goal in many major American cities. Frequent “Code Red” or “Code Orange” days
trigger radio announcements that warn parents not to allow their children to play outside
because smog could trigger asthma attacks. See, e.g., Air Quality Index: Using Air Quality
Information to Protect Yourself from Outdoor Air Pollution, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://www.
lungusa.org/healthy-air/outdoor/air-quality-index.html (last visited Aug 7, 2011).
165.
See infra notes 218–226, 243–253 and accompanying text.
166.
Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96–354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006)).
167.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980)
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2006)).
168.
Id. 94 Stat. at 2814–15.
169.
See COPELAND, supra note 147.
170.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); COPELAND, supra note 147, at 3–4.
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All covered agencies171 must refrain from taking action unless
potential benefits outweigh potential costs.172 The agencies must
also consider regulatory alternatives that involve the lowest net
cost.173

2. Agencies must prepare a “regulatory impact analysis” (RIA)
containing their cost-benefit analysis for each “major” rule, defined to include any proposal that would have an annual effect
on the economy of $100 million or more.174
3. Agencies must send a copy of each proposed and final rule to
OIRA before it is published in the Federal Register.175 Agencies
were instructed to refrain from publishing rules until they had
responded to any concerns raised by OIRA staff.176
Agencies were required to forward proposed and final rules, along with
accompanying RIAs, to OIRA at least sixty days prior to their publication.177 OIRA would be “deemed to have concluded review” within thirty
days of submission of a major final rule or rule proposal unless “the Director
advises the agency to the contrary,” in essence giving OIRA discretion to
extend its review period indefinitely.178
In addition to formalizing cost-benefit analysis—notably, without any
statutory authority—Executive Order 12,291 is significant because of the
dynamic it set up between agency heads and the OIRA Administrator. The
order did not go so far as to hand OIRA the power to kill a rule outright,
an outcome that arguably would be illegal under EPA’s authorizing statutes,
which delegate rulemaking mandates directly to the agency Administrator
as opposed to the President.179 But given the White House’s sway over
agency heads, that explicit grant of final authority was unnecessary. Instead,
the instruction to consult—and implicitly to satisfy—OIRA’s economists
set up an inside game dynamic reminiscent of the NIPCC and now quite
171.
The order—and all subsequent regulatory review orders—exempts independent
regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, but covers all Cabinet departments and free-standing executive branch agencies such as EPA. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, OIRA Administrator, to the
Heads of Independent Regulatory Agencies (July 22, 2011) available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memorandum/2011/m11-28.pdf.
172.
Exec. Order 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 128.
173.
Id. § 3(d)(4).
174.
Id. §§ 1(b)(1), 3(d)(4).
175.
Id. § 3(c).
176.
Id. § 3(f)(2).
177.
Id. § 3(c).
178.
Id. § 3(e).
179.
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7601(a)(1) (2006).
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entrenched: all disputes would be negotiated behind closed doors at the
staff level, no matter how difficult the dispute and how garbled the resulting compromise.
President Reagan’s second and last executive order on regulatory
review, Executive Order 12,498, extended OIRA’s power further by requiring covered agencies to submit entire regulatory programs to OIRA on an
annual basis, specifying that OIRA had the authority to “return” individual
rulemaking proposals to an agency for “reconsideration” if the item had not
been included or was “materially different” from what the annual agenda
described.180 This development in effect ratified the idea that OIRA was
not merely a passive recipient of whatever ideas the agencies chose to
advance, but instead had some responsibility for reviewing the wisdom of
their overall regulatory priorities.
Reagan’s expansion of OIRA’s authority and intrusiveness generated
controversy in the press and on Capitol Hill. Congress included many
strong advocates of environmental and other health and safety protections,
including Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and James Florio
(D-NJ), both of whom were instrumental in conducting rigorous and unrelenting oversight of OIRA’s activities.181 In 1983, Congress allowed the
appropriation for OIRA’s regulatory review activities to expire, but the unit
continued to receive funding for its work under the Paperwork Reduction
Act through its mother institution, OMB.182 OIRA was reauthorized in
1986 by a law that made its director subject to Senate confirmation, thereby
giving Congress leverage over its leadership, at least initially.183 But, perhaps most remarkably, in 1985 five House committee chairmen filed a
friend-of-the-court brief supporting a lawsuit brought by the Public Citizen
Litigation Group against OSHA, which had refused to regulate ethylene
oxide in the workplace, reportedly at OIRA’s behest.184 Members of Congress
very rarely participate in judicial proceedings, making this episode a telling
expression of their restlessness over OIRA’s deregulatory efforts in a decidedly divided government.

180.
Exec. Order No. 12,498 §§ 1, 3, 3 C.F.R. 323, 323, 325 (1986).
181.
For a vivid description of these events, see David Osborne, State of Siege: Can
Democrats Mastermind the Great Escape?, MOTHER JONES, Feb./Mar. 1982, at 22, 22–31. I
worked for Representative Florio at that time as staff counsel to the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
that he chaired, and they worked closely with Representative Waxman’s Subcommittee on
Health.
182.
COPELAND, supra note 147, at 7.
183.
Id.
184.
Id. For a fuller description of the battle to regulate ethylene oxide, see David C.
Vladeck, Unreasonable Delay, Unreasonable Intervention: The Battle to Force Regulation of Ethylene Oxide, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 190 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
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As Reagan’s Vice President, George H.W. Bush served as the chair of a
cabinet-level “Task Force on Regulatory Relief,” a self-styled forum of last
resort for industries that could not convince agencies to acquiesce to their
demands.185 The Task Force assembled a “hit list” of suspect regulations
nominated by industry.186 When he became President, the elder Bush toned
down his position, at least with respect to natural resource issues, declaring
himself the “environmental president” and supporting passage of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, the most ambitious environmental statute ever
passed.187 His overall record as President was a moderate one, partially
eclipsing his role as deregulatory point person.188
Professor Percival notes that the elder President Bush once exclaimed
that he could not understand why he could not simply mandate that agencies act in a certain way, despite their detailed statutory mandates, having
them “salute smartly and go execute whatever decision I make.”189 Despite
this confusion about the scope of presidential authority when Congress has
conferred non-discretionary mandates on agencies, his presidency is not
known for using OIRA to aggressively monitor and change industry
behavior.

C. 1992–2000: “Collegial” Review
The election of William Jefferson Clinton assuaged congressional
Democrats’ fears about OIRA’s influence on health, safety, and environmental
regulation to some extent, and, to reassure these critics, the new administration wasted no time putting its own stamp on the process, issuing
Executive Order 12,866 to replace 12,291 and 12,498 in September 1993.190
Although the Clinton approach preserved OIRA’s authority to consult
with respect to “significant” rules (those that would impose economic
effects over $100 million annually or “adversely affect” the economy “in a
material way”), it imposed some important constraints on the process.191
OIRA was given a series of mandatory deadlines for the conclusion of
review, with the review period limited to ninety days following submission of the rule by an agency or department, although that deadline was
subject to one possible extension of thirty days if the extension was
approved in writing by the OIRA Administrator and the head of the agency

185.
See Percival, supra note 143, at 148.
186.
Id.
187.
ANDREWS, supra note 149, at 331.
188.
See id.
189.
Percival, supra note 150, at 995.
190.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
191.
Id. § 3(f)(1) (defining “significant regulatory action”); id. § 6(b)(1) (“OIRA may
review only actions identified by the agency or by OIRA as significant . . . .”).
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responsible for the rule requested the extension.192 As significantly, Executive Order 12,866 required that after a regulatory action was published in
the Federal Register, or after an agency or department had announced its
decision not to pursue the regulatory action, OIRA “shall make available to
the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency during
the review by OIRA under this section.”193 These before-and-after documents would reveal the extent and nature of the changes OIRA demanded
from the agencies. Last but not least, although the Clinton order required
agencies to conduct, and OIRA to review, cost-benefit analyses, the ultimate
standard for acceptance of a rule was whether benefits “justified” costs, a
formula perceived as significantly more flexible than the Reagan requirement that benefits “outweigh” costs.194 These reforms were useful, but they
did not eliminate OIRA’s gatekeeper authority.
President Clinton continued the use of cost-benefit analysis in order to
demonstrate his commitment to reining in “big government,” thereby shoring up his credentials as a new and different type of Democrat.195 During
the Clinton administration, OIRA’s intervention in rulemaking was less
aggressive and destructive than before. For example, the number of rules
reviewed by OIRA dropped precipitously from an average of 2,400 annually under the Reagan and Bush executive orders to an annual average of 615
during President Clinton’s two terms.196 But the infrastructure remained
available for a resurgence of a far more intrusive strain of centralized
review. Clinton legitimized this structure, doing as much to establish
OIRA’s hegemony as arbiter of health, safety, and environmental policy as
the concerted efforts of the preceding twelve years of Republican presidencies.
Because previous critiques of centralized regulatory review were
fundamentally partisan—that is, liberal Democrats blaming conservative
Republicans for hostility to a proactive regulatory state—the decision by
the moderate, Democratic Clinton administration to maintain cost-benefit
analysis driven regulatory review at the White House radically changed the
debate. At the moment Executive Order 12,866 was signed, advocates of
the agencies’ active and unimpeded pursuit of their core missions were
transformed into outliers existing on the left fringe of the mainstream
political parties. Cost-benefit analysis was embraced on a bipartisan basis.
The most diehard opponents of a robust regulatory state—including selfinterested industries and traditional conservatives opposed to the expansion
of government—had a home at the center of both parties. And the agencies
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646–47 (1994).
Id. § 6(b)(4)(D).
COPELAND, supra note 147, at 9.
STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 106, at 92.
COPELAND, supra note 147, at 10.
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were pushed into eight more years of learning to justify their judgments
through the prism of market failure: only if the market would not correct
the harm caused to people or natural resources could regulatory controls be
justified.
In retrospect, what is most surprising about this turn of events is that a
robust and talented cadre of critics of cost-benefit analysis persisted in
attacking this methodology, even as OIRA’s role as the court of last resort
for regulatory opponents became established as an institutional fixture of
regulatory affairs.197 But by the end of the George W. Bush administration,
the details of cost-benefit methodology were far less important than the use
of OIRA as the forum-of-choice for regulatory review, realizing the goals of
Nixon’s early quality of life reviews to an extent that the originators of that
process could not have imagined.

D. 2000–2009: Gatekeeper with Teeth
George W. Bush took office without acknowledging the political constraints imposed by an extremely close election and was determined to push
government policies far to the right. In the regulatory arena, Vice President
Richard Cheney rapidly established an atmosphere modeled on the earlier
Reagan campaign to sharply curb health, safety, and environmental
regulation.198 John Graham, a well-known and enthusiastic practitioner of
cost-benefit analysis, became the OIRA Administrator for the first five
years of the administration’s two terms.199 In a stroke of political brilliance,
the new President retained Executive Order 12,866, throwing his opponents off balance, at least initially, by claiming that he was not changing the
regulatory review policies embraced by the more liberal Clinton administration. A reasonable guess is that Graham advised the President that the
infrastructure created by the Clinton order was flexible enough to permit
an enthusiastic revival of OIRA’s interference in agency rulemaking. In
October 2002, Graham said:
[T]he changes we are making at OMB in pursuit of smarter regulation are not headline grabbers: No far-reaching legislative
initiatives, no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns of

197.
For examples of such criticisms, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 18;
MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 142–64; Parker, supra note 18, at 1357–81.
198.
For a vivid example of this aspect of the Cheney era, see Jo Becker & Barton
Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at A1.
199.
For an account of Graham’s tenure at OIRA as he remembers it, see John D.
Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395,
456–80 (2008).
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regulatory relief. Yet we are making some changes that we believe
will have a long-lasting impact on the regulatory state.200
Curtis Copeland, the Congressional Research Service’s veteran expert on
regulatory review, explains that OIRA returned to a “gatekeeper role,”
noting that Graham defined his mission as “protect[ing] people from poorly
designed rules.”201 Graham’s tenure, as well as the two years served by his
successor, Susan Dudley, were defined by a sharp increase in the use of
“return letters” asking agencies to rethink regulatory proposals and by a
determined re-emphasis on economic analysis as the fulcrum for deciding
whether rules should live or die.202
Graham also revised OIRA’s guidance to agencies on how to conduct
cost-benefit analysis, imposing, among other requirements, stricter rules
regarding the “discounting” of regulatory benefits for rules that would have
a beneficial effect on future generations.203 Discounting refers to the practice of treating a monetized benefit or cost as an investment, with money
transferred today worth more than money transferred five years from now.
The rationale for discounting is to ensure that a future benefit—for example,
a life saved in the fifth year after a regulation goes into effect—is worth
only the amount of money that would need to be invested today to accrue
the value of that life over the same period, using rates that track long-term
return rates estimated by the Department of Treasury. The Clinton guidance gave agencies discretion on which discount rate to use, while the Bush
guidance instructed them to calculate benefits using both a seven and a
three percent rate, even in instances where regulatory interventions would
achieve benefits far in the future.204 Longer-term discounting is an especially
salient issue today because of the so-called “intergenerational equity” problems caused by climate change. If benefits for our children’s children occur
in fifty years, and a relatively high discount rate is used, the monetary value
of those benefits in present-day money dwindles to almost nothing.205
Graham’s OIRA justified this outcome as follows:
200.
COPELAND, supra note 147, at 18 (footnote omitted).
201.
Id. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
202.
Id. at 19–20.
203.
Compare Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Jan. 11, 1996), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
omb/inforeg/riaguide.html [hereinafter Clinton Best Practices Memorandum], with Circular A–4,
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars_a004_a-4/ [hereinafter Bush Circular A–4].
204.
Clinton Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 203; Bush Circular A–4, supra note 203.
205.
For an explanation of the problems with cost-benefit analysis, complete with a
calculator demonstrating diminishing benefits under discounting, see Frank Ackerman &
Lisa Heinzerling, CPR Perspective: Cost-Benefit Analysis, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
http://www.progressivereform.org/perspCostbenefit.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
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Some believe . . . that it is ethically impermissible to discount the
utility of future generations. That is, government should treat all
generations equally. Even under this approach, it would still be
correct to discount future costs and consumption benefits generally
(perhaps at a lower rate than for intragenerational analysis), due to
the expectation that future generations will be wealthier and thus
will value a marginal dollar of benefits or costs by less than those
alive today.206
In other words, OIRA under Graham took the position that it does not
matter if discounting eliminates projections of any benefits for future generations because Americans will be increasingly wealthy and able to afford
to remedy the environmental degradation past generations have left behind.
The Obama administration has left these instructions in place. Meanwhile,
polling conducted in 2006 and again in 2010 demonstrates that a majority
of Americans worry constantly about their children’s future quality of life,
fearing it will be decidedly less positive than life now.207
The other important innovation of the Graham/Dudley era was OIRA’s
energetic assertion of jurisdiction over science policy. Graham realized that
the source of many, if not most, of the rules he disliked arose from decisions made to invoke the “precautionary principle”—that is, the theory that
government cannot afford to wait until an airtight scientific case documents
the link between toxic chemical exposure and irreversible adverse health
effects. The precautionary principle is the backbone of every significant
American statute that controls toxic exposures because all those laws instruct agencies to prevent harm, rather than waiting for it to materialize.208
206.
Bush Circular A–4, supra note 203. The Obama administration retained Bush
Circular A–4 but applied both a three percent and a five percent discount rate to the social
costs of carbon emissions—the cause of climate change. See Frank Ackerman, EPA and
NHTSA Lowball Estimates of Carbon Costs in Proposed Tailpipe Emissions Standard, CPR BLOG
(Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=5A24178F-D2D0D3D8-E101B3E5C8155F5B; see also Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74
Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,677–80 (proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86,
600, 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 537–38) (discussing the choice of discount rate).
207.
See Rich Miller, Americans See Children’s Future Dim in Poll as 50% Pessimistic,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-13/
americans-see-children-s-future-dim-in-poll-as-50-pessimistic.html; Once Again, the Future
Ain’t What It Used to Be, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 2, 2006), http://pewresearch.org/
pubs/311/once-again-the-future-aint-what-it-used-to-be (“The idea that each generation of
children will grow up to be better off than the one that preceded it has always been a part of
the American dream. But barely a third of adults expect things to work out that way for
today’s children, according to a new Pew Research Center survey.”).
208.
See, e.g., David Kriebel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science,
109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871, 871–72 (2001). But see Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary
Principle as a Basis for Decision Making, 2 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 2–3, 7 (2005), http://
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Indeed, the most compelling statement of the principle as it is embodied in
American law was made by Judge James Skelly Wright in upholding EPA’s
first significant regulatory decision—the elimination of lead from gasoline:
Man’s ability to alter his environment has developed far more rapidly than his ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his
alterations. It is only recently that we have begun to appreciate the
danger posed by unregulated modification of the world around us,
and have created watchdog agencies whose task it is to warn us, and
protect us . . . . [U]nequipped with crystal balls and unable to read
the future, [these agencies] are nonetheless charged with evaluating
the effects of unprecedented environmental modifications, often
made on a massive scale. Necessarily, they must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with developing evidence, with conflicting
evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at all.209
Not satisfied with merely using cost-benefit analysis to combat precaution
as his predecessors had done, Graham mounted two forays designed to
change the fundamental risk assessment practices used by the agencies,
especially EPA. The first involved peer review of scientific studies.210
Graham’s approach would have made it much more difficult for agencies to
include federally funded researchers on such panels because they were
suspected of harboring pro-regulation biases.211 The second, even more
ambitious proposal focused on how agencies assess the risks posed by toxic
chemical exposures, insisting that they consider the overall harm that could
be suffered by the general population rather than focusing on the more
elevated and alarming risks to vulnerable populations (for example, children, those living with AIDS, or the elderly).212 Fortunately, both proposals
were defeated by a combination of public interest group advocacy and
www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss2/art8/ (criticizing the precautionary principle as providing no
decision-making guidance).
209.
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
210.
For an insightful analysis of the implications of the draft guidance policy, see
Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Disclosure and Disinterest, SCIENCE, Jan. 2, 2004, at 15 (calling
the OMB bulletin “over-engineered” and criticizing its assumption that scientists with ties
to regulatory agencies should be disqualified from peer review of studies used in rulemaking). Dr. Kennedy is the editor of Science, former President of Stanford University (1980–
92), and former Administrator of the FDA (1977–79). Donald Kennedy, PhD, FREEMAN
SPOGLI INST. FOR INT’L STUD. STANFORD U., http://fsi.stanford.edu/people/donaldkennedy
(last visited October 1, 2011).
211.
For a critique of this initiative, see Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review
Procedures, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10064, 10068–69 (2004).
212.
See Rena Steinzor, The Legacy of John Graham: Strait-Jacketing Risk Assessment, RISK
POL’Y REP., May 23, 2006. But see James W. Conrad, Jr., OMB’s Draft Bulletin on Risk Assessment: Improving the Process, RISK POL’Y REP., May 23, 2006 (arguing that the changes
advocated by OIRA were long overdue).
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opposition from scientific bodies such as the American Association for the
Advancement of Science and the National Research Council.213
To his credit, Graham made some significant strides in increasing the
transparency of OIRA’s activities, posting notices of meetings with outside
parties and making return letters available on its website.214 But OIRA did
not fulfill—and still has not fulfilled—the most important transparency
mandate established by Executive Order 12,866: publicly disclosing the
regulatory proposals sent to OIRA by agencies and the edited versions of
those documents following OIRA’s review.
Despite the success of the stratagem that preserved Clinton’s Executive
Order 12,866, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,422 at the tail end
of his administration, 215 likely in an effort to further entrench OIRA’s
power in case a Democrat was elected President. The new order made
several changes in regulatory review, including requirements that (1) agencies identify the “market failure” that justifies a regulation (thereby
implying that without one, they had no authority to control industrial
activities); (2) agencies estimate cumulative regulatory costs and benefits of
rules they expect to publish over the next year; and (3) OIRA review extend to “significant guidance documents.”216 This development triggered
another round of criticism that OIRA was overreaching by further expanding
its influence over the daily activities of the agencies.217
One of the most notable events in OIRA’s bureaucratic history occurred
in the last weeks of George W. Bush’s second term, when a heated confrontation between Susan Dudley (John Graham’s successor) and Marcus
Peacock (the number two political appointee at EPA) became public.218
Dudley and Peacock were fighting over an effort to lower the “secondary”

213.
See, e.g., Cornelia Dean, Risk-Assessment Plan Is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2007, at A19; Ralph Lindeman, OMB Regulatory Policy Chief Anticipates New Draft of Risk
Assessment Guidance, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 90, at A-24 (May 10, 2007).
214.
COPELAND, supra note 147, at 19–21.
215.
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2007). When President Obama took office
two years later, among his first acts was the repeal of this order. Executive Order No. 13,497,
3 C.F.R. 218 (2009).
216.
Exec. Order No. 13,422 §§ 1(a), 4(c), 7, 3 C.F.R. 191, 191–93 (2007).
217.
See, e.g., CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33862, CHANGES
TO THE OMB REGULATORY REVIEW PROCESS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13422, at 17–18
(2007); Margaret Kriz, Thumbing His Nose, NAT’L J., July 28, 2007, at 32.
218.
For a detailed description of this episode, see STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note
106, at 205. For a compilation of the key documents telling this story, see White House
Overruled EPA Administrator on Ozone Regulation, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM,
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=349
1:white-house-overruled-epa-administrator-on-ozone-regulation&catid=43:investigations
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011) [hereinafter White House Overruled EPA].
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standard for ozone pollution that affects crops and plants.219 EPA had
undertaken a long proceeding that included extensive consultations with its
statutorily created Clean Air Act Science Advisory Committee (CASAC),
and had already disappointed the scientists in setting the “primary” ozone
NAAQS to the extent that the Committee sent an extraordinarily strong
letter to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson, warning him, “[I]t is the
Committee’s consensus scientific opinion that your decision to set the
primary ozone standard above this [0.060 to 0.070 parts per million] range
fails to satisfy the explicit stipulations of the Clean Air Act that you ensure
an adequate margin of safety for all individuals, including sensitive populations.”220 A week before EPA planned to release its final decision on both
the primary and secondary NAAQS, Dudley wrote EPA Administrator
Stephen Johnson a memorandum explaining that she disagreed with the
standard.221 She argued that EPA should have considered economic values
in setting the standard.222 Peacock responded on behalf of the agency that
cost was not a legally permissible criterion under the specific section of the
Clean Air Act at stake in the decision.223 Although the details of how the
final decision was made have not surfaced, OIRA’s position prevailed,
putting the administration in the position of endorsing the view that costs
could be considered in establishing NAAQS.224 Recognizing this reality,
Johnson suggested when he announced the revised standard that Congress
needed to consider changing the statute to allow future administrators to
consider costs.225 Dr. Rogene Henderson, Chair of CASAC, testified before

219.
Memorandum from Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Majority Staff, to
Members of the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, (May 20, 2008), available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20080520094002.pdf
[hereinafter House Majority Staff Memorandum].
220.
Letter from Clean Air Scientific Advisory Comm. to EPA Adm’r Stephen
Johnson (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/
4AF8764324331288852574250069E494/$File/EPA-CASAC-08-009-unsigned.pdf. CASAC’s
original recommendations that the standards be tightened significantly were unanimous. Id.
221.
Memorandum from Susan E. Dudley to OIRA Adm’r Stephen Johnson (Mar.
6, 2008), available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/
20080520091254.pdf.
222.
Id. (“EPA has not considered or evaluated the effects of adopting a W126 [secondary] standard on economic values, personal comfort and well-being, as specifically
enumerated in the Act.”).
223.
Memorandum from Marcus Peacock to Susan Dudley (Mar. 7, 2008), available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20080520091448.pdf.
224.
Matthew L. Wald, Environmental Agency Tightens Smog Standards, N.Y. TIMES,
March 13, 2008, at A12.
225.
See id.; Stephen Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, Press Conference Call Regarding National
Ozone Standards – Final Rule Announcement (Mar. 12, 2008) (transcript available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/dff15a5d01abdfb1852573590040b7f7/cfbccfab3e932
82f8525740a0073a9ba!OpenDocument).
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Congress that, as a result of OIRA’s interference, “[w]ilful [sic] ignorance
triumphed over sound science.”226
One other lesson from the ozone confrontation worth emphasizing is
that OIRA assumed negative economic effects of the stricter ozone standard, but did not cite a cost-benefit analysis in staking out its position. This
omission suggests that while such analyses consume significant time and
resources, they may not always be the determinative factor in high-profile
regulatory decisions. Another example of this phenomenon is the George
W. Bush administration’s decision to use a lax, market-based “cap and
trade” approach to controlling mercury emissions from power plants.227 The
cost-benefit analysis ultimately compiled to justify the rule, which would
have not gone into effect until 2018 and was supported avidly by electric
utilities, demonstrated that costs exceeded benefits by as much as 448 to 1.
Nevertheless, OIRA, supposedly the enforcer of the principle that benefits
must exceed costs, cleared the way for the final rule, with a Federal Register
notice that admitted:
Using these alternate discount rates, the social costs of the final rule
are estimated to be approximately $848 million in 2020 when assuming a 3 percent discount rate. These costs become $896 million
in 2020 if one assumes a 7 percent discount rate. . . . As is discussed above, the total social benefits that EPA was able to monetize in
the RIA total $0.4 million to $3.0 million using a 3 percent discount
rate, and $0.2 million to $2.0 million using a 7 percent discount rate.228
A coalition of environmental groups and states that planned to enact their
own, far more stringent mercury standards ultimately persuaded the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to overturn the rule,
and the Obama administration is now reconsidering it.229
226.
EPA’s New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 110th Cong. 87 (2008) (statement of Rogene F. Henderson, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Comm.), available at http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/
20080520141503.pdf.
227.
For more extensive discussion of this sequence of events, see Lisa Heinzerling &
Rena Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part II, 34 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,485, 10,488–91 (2004).
228.
Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,642 (May 18, 2005) (emphasis
added); see also JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32868, MERCURY
EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EPA’S CAP-AND-TRADE
REGULATIONS (2006).
229.
New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For information on what
EPA is doing in response to the opinion, see Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) for
Power Plants, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/ (last visited Sept. 11,
2011).
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E. 2009–Present
1. Business as Usual
By the time Cass Sunstein, a former Harvard Law School professor
with a lengthy, eclectic, and provocative publication record, was confirmed
as OIRA Administrator in September 2009,230 troubling signs of acute
regulatory failure were present for all to see. This Article focuses on failures
in the arena of programs to protect public health, worker safety, and the
environment. But what may turn out to be the seminal event for the
Obama administration’s historical legacy is the failure of the regulatory
system designed to police investment practices, which in turn triggered a
worldwide economic recession.231 Neither the President nor Sunstein have
ever publicly associated the identical causes of the two sets of problems:
namely, hollow (or underfunded) government, weak laws, and the collapse
of an aggressive enforcement culture.232
Sunstein was a friend of the President when both taught at the University of Chicago Law School and an early participant in the Obama
campaign.233 Although his own scholarship has extended significantly
beyond regulatory policy to encompass constitutional interpretation and

230.
According to his bibliography on the University of Chicago Law School website,
Sunstein is responsible for 424 individual publications, including thirty-two books. See Cass
R. Sunstein: Publications, U. CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/3552/publications
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011). Largely because of statements made in these extensive writings,
Sunstein endured a long, tortured nomination process marked by repeated attacks from
conservative Senators who represent ranchers, hunters, and agricultural corporations. See,
e.g., Rebecca Adams, The Costs and Benefits of Cass Sunstein, CONG. Q. WKLY., Feb. 9, 2009, at
293; David Weigel, Attacks on Sunstein Frustrate Conservative Fans, WASH. INDEP. (Sept. 9,
2009, 12:01 AM), http://washingtonindependent.com/58152/attacks-on-sunstein-frustrateconservative-fans; see also 155 CONG. REC. S7574–75 (daily ed. July 15, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Saxby Chambliss).
231.
David Leonhardt, Heading Off the Next Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar.
28, 2010, at 36–39 (observing that “[f]inance evolved, and Washington did not keep up”).
232.
See, e.g., DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND
THE DEATH OF TRUST (2011) (explaining how the weakness of the Securities and Exchange
Commission facilitated the operation of the largest Ponzi scheme in history); BETHANY
MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010) (discussing the irresponsible mortgage banking that caused the
financial crisis and was enabled by a lack of regulation); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG
TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009) (explaining how Wall Street’s top
executives succeeded in weakening rules that could have prevented the crash of the stock
market in 2008 and the subsequent, ongoing economic recession).
233.
Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., The Obama I Know, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2008, § 1, at
27 (endorsing Obama).
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civil rights,234 Sunstein’s positions on regulatory issues are consistently
critical of the precautionary principle and supportive of strict cost-benefit
analysis.235 His nomination sent the message that even as the new President
appointed aggressive agency heads like EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson,
his administration would continue centralized White House review as the
ultimate arbiter of regulatory policy.
Somewhere between thirty-five and forty OIRA “desk officers” and
“branch chiefs” review approximately seven hundred regulatory matters
annually.236 The disparities between OIRA’s scant resources and the more
ample, but still inadequate, resources of the health, safety, and environmental agencies make high-profile assertions of its prerogatives essential. If
OIRA tried to scrutinize each rule that comes to it for review with any
level of intensity, it would soon sink beneath the waves of an impossible
workload. Instead, it singles out a handful of rules for special attention,
engaging in a kind of deterrence-based oversight that gives agencies strong
incentives to anticipate OIRA’s objections before they even send a rule over
for review.
Sunstein’s ambition when he was first nominated in January 2009 was
to issue a new executive order revamping 12,866 in order to introduce ideas
developed under the rubric of “behavioral economics,” a long-time passion
in his academic writing,237 and President Obama issued a memorandum
directing OIRA to undertake such revisions.238 In an unprecedented move,
the White House opened this project to public comment, ultimately receiving 183 separate documents, primarily from industry interest groups.239 But
the process did not produce a new order. Instead, months after the deadline
stated in the President’s memorandum, Sunstein acknowledged that he
would proceed with regulatory review under Executive Order 12,866, the
process in effect under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.240

234.
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004).
235.
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 11. Despite his suspicion of traditional regulation,
Sunstein favors intervention in the marketplace through consumer disclosures that “nudge”
people to make decisions in their self-interest. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (rev. & expanded ed. 2009).
236.
COPELAND, supra note 147, at 28.
237.
See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
238.
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009).
239.
Cheryl Bolen, Revamped Process to Review Agency Regulations Not Imminent, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 46, at C-1 (Mar. 11, 2010); see also Public Comments on OMB
Recommendations for a New Executive Order on Regulatory Review, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp (last visited Nov.
1, 2010).
240.
Bolen, supra note 239.
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The track record of OIRA under President Obama is significantly
more controversial than its performance under President Clinton, but
somewhat less contentious than its performance under President George
W. Bush. Unlike Graham, Sunstein has not attempted to issue broad policy
statements on sensitive subjects like risk assessment. Yet his OIRA has
proved quite intrusive in agency decision making and he has openly boasted
about the administration’s determination to curb allegedly excessive regulation.241 Critics have emphasized Sunstein’s penchant for derailing or
curbing proposals to strengthen protections for workers and the environment.242
The two most salient examples of the long-term implications of Sunstein’s efforts to craft regulatory policy are OIRA’s suppression of EPA’s
latest efforts to tighten the NAAQS for ozone and its treatment of EPA’s
proposed coal ash rule. OIRA could not have achieved either result without
the support of the President—explicit in the case of ozone and tacit in the
case of coal ash. But in a regulatory system that depends on highly detailed
statutory mandates to agencies like EPA, the politicization of the rulemaking process through OIRA cannot be dismissed by the facile conclusion
that the involvement of the President justifies such outcomes.

2. Ozone Reversal
On September 2, 2011, the Friday morning before a long Labor Day
weekend, President Obama issued a statement announcing that he had
instructed EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to suspend efforts to update the
NAAQS for ozone.243 According to the return letter Sunstein sent to Jackson,
the President’s decision was based on his concern about the “uncertainty”
that tougher standards would pose for regulated industries:
Under the Act, finalizing a new standard now is not mandatory and
could produce needless uncertainty. The Act explicitly sets out a
five-year cycle for review of national ambient air quality standards.
The current cycle began in 2008, and EPA shall be compelled to
241.
Cass Sunstein, Smarter Regulation, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 7, 2011, 11:29 AM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/07/smarter-regulation.
242.
See, e.g., Dan Froomkin, Cass Sunstein: The Obama Administration’s Ambivalent
Regulator, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011, 9:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/06/13/cass-sunstein-obama-ambivalent-regulator-czar_n_874530.html.
243.
John M. Broder, Obama Abandons A Stricter Limit on Air Pollution, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2011, at A1 (“President Obama abandoned a contentious new air pollution rule on
Friday, buoying business interests that had lobbied heavily against it, angering environmentalists who called the move a betrayal and unnerving his own top environmental
regulators.”); Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Ozone National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards.
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revisit the most recent ozone standards again in 2013. . . . [I]ssuing
a final rule in late 2011 would be problematic in view of the fact
that a new assessment, and potentially new standards, will be developed in the relatively near future.244
The background to this episode of déjà vu over ozone is that in September
2009, Jackson had asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to suspend a lawsuit brought by environmentalists to
challenge the George W. Bush-era ozone standards, stating that she was
withdrawing them in order to initiate a rulemaking that would develop
significantly more stringent limits.245 But the agency kept delaying this
proceeding, signaling the outbreak of another political tug-of-war at the
White House.246
Because Jackson had suspended what she had labeled a “legally indefensible”247 standard, the President’s decision to order her to stand down until
at least 2013 appeared to have left in place a 1997 standard that is substantially weaker than even the Bush-era one.248 However, Jackson subsequently
announced that she was reinstating the Bush standard she had earlier
disdained.249 The Bush standard was 0.075 parts per million (ppm) in the
ambient air, while the Obama administration had proposed lowering that
number to between 0.060 ppm and 0.070 ppm; the 1997 standard Bush
sought to replace was 0.08 ppm.250 According to EPA estimates, lowering
the standard to 0.060 ppm would avoid 4,000 to 12,000 premature deaths,
244.
Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, OIRA, to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA
(Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/EPA_Return_Letter_
9-2-2011.pdf.
245.
Andrew Childers, EPA Will Reconsider Air Quality Standards for Ozone Set During
the Bush Administration, 40 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2173 (Sept. 18, 2009). For discussion of the
controversy that enveloped the Bush-era ozone rules, see supra notes 218–226 and accompanying text.
246.
See, e.g., Andrew Childers, EPA Postpones Ozone Air Standards Until July 2011, Seeks
Adviser Recommendations, 41 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2725 (Dec. 10, 2010).
247.
Gabriel Nelson, Bush Ozone Standards Are ‘Not Legally Defensible’—EPA Chief, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/14/14greenwire-bush-ozonestandards-are-not-legally-defensibl-19743.html (“The standards chosen by the George W.
Bush admistration to protect people from smog probably wouldn’t hold up in court, EPA
Administrator Lisa Jacckson says in a new letter to a key congressional ally, giving the best
indication yet that the agency is planning to set stricter pollution limits this summer.”).
248.
Andrew Childers & Jessica Coomes, Enforcement of Ozone Rules Left Uncertain as
White House Drops Reconsideration Plans, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1966 (Sept. 9, 2011) (“ ‘The
big question we have right now is, ‘Will they enforce the 2008 standard or will we be stuck
with the 1997 standard?’ ’ Janice Nolen, assistant vice president for policy and advocacy at
the American Lung Association, said.”).
249.
Jessica Coomes & Andrew Childers, Jackson Says EPA Required to Implement Bush
Administration Standard for Ozone, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2117 (Sept. 23, 2011).
250.
Id.

258

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 1:1

21,000 hospital and emergency room visits, 111,000 upper and lower respiratory symptoms, 58,000 cases of aggravated asthma, 2.5 million days when
individual people miss work or school, and 8.1 million days when individual
people must restrict their work or other activities, generating total, monetized benefits in the range of $35 billion to $100 billion annually.251 (These
large ranges reflect the difficulty of quantifying future benefits that afflicts
all such analyses.)
Again, the Clean Air Act requires EPA to reconsider its NAAQS every
five years, consulting with a statutorily created scientific advisory board
before setting the final number.252 Frustrated by the Obama administration’s repeated delays, environmentalists and the governments of thirteen
states had already announced in August 2011 that they would ask the D.C.
Circuit to reinstate their lawsuit against the Bush-era standard,253 and they
appear to have a very good chance of success, given the science advisory
board’s unanimous advice that EPA revise it to a significantly lower number.254
The prospect of a federal appellate court ordering EPA to ignore the
President’s order underscores the cynicism of White House interference.
This distasteful impression is underscored by the fact that even had Jackson
been allowed to promulgate the more stringent standard, implementation
efforts—and therefore the expenditure of private sector compliance
costs—would not have gotten underway for several more years, making
the President’s invocation of the present economic recession that much
more embarrassing.255
But perhaps the most enduring implication of OIRA’s role in justifying
the ozone delay is the peculiar rationale that regulatory uncertainty justifies
postponing statutorily mandated decisions to tighten controls on pollutants.
In fact, OIRA had set the stage for this outcome by crafting the new
Executive Order, 13,563, signed by the President on January 21, 2011.256 The
251. EPA, FACT SHEET: SUPPLEMENT TO THE REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR OZONE
(2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/glo/pdfs/fs20100106ria.pdf.
252.
42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2006).
253.
Jessica Coomes, 13 States Join Request to D.C. Circuit for Order to Finalize Ozone
Standards, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1861 (Aug. 19, 2011).
254.
See supra notes 220, 226 and accompanying text.
255.
The Clean Air Act delegates to the states the task of developing “State Implementation Plans” to put new NAAQS into effect. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). These plans take
years to develop, and must then be translated into permit limits or other regulatory requirements for pollution sources that emit the pollutants that become ozone. EPA therefore
projected that it would take until 2031 for the new standard to be fully implemented by the
states. Fact Sheet: Proposal to Revise the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, EPA,
3, http://www.epa.gov/glo/pdfs/fs20100106std.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). The President’s decision means, of course, that the nation will be compelled to live with the outdated
1997 standard until the late 2030s—or even later—unless a court orders faster EPA action.
256.
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
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order is most notable for its requirement that agencies undertake “retrospective analyses of existing rules,” an activity designed to placate
increasingly harsh criticism of the regulatory system by House Republicans.257 But it apparently had much greater significance for OIRA
Administrator Sunstein, who cited it in his return letter to EPA Administrator Jackson, noting that Executive Order 13,563 “emphasizes that our
regulatory system ‘must promote predictability and reduce uncertainty’”
and asserting that “the President has directed me to continue to work closely
with all executive agencies and departments to implement Executive Order
13,563 and to minimize regulatory costs and burdens, particularly in this
economically challenging time.”258 In effect, this elastic and potentially
infinite grant of discretion to the President, as represented by OIRA, could
justify the suspension of any rulemaking, whether or not any direct, factual
link is established between the regulatory proposal and difficulties in
achieving an economic recovery. As Professor Daniel Farber has noted,
“there’s so much wrong with the ‘uncertainty’ argument that it’s hard to
know where to begin,” including the fact that “unemployment is currently
lowest in health care, extractive industries and the financial sector—exactly
the areas where there has been the most regulatory effort.”259

3. The Coal Ash Proposal
As for EPA’s coal ash rule, OIRA delayed the proposal for seven
months—well beyond the allotted ninety-day review period under Executive Order 12,866—while it rewrote both the rulemaking notice and the
regulatory impact statement drafted by EPA.260 Given the prominence of

257.
Id. at 3,822.
258.
Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 244.
259.
Daniel Farber, Ten Fatal Flaws in the “Regulatory Uncertainty” Argument, CPRBLOG
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=5DF93B0FD47C-D726-57628120754ECD93.
260.
EPA has posted two versions of its draft proposal for regulation concerning the
disposal of coal combustion residuals from electric utilities, hazardous substance designation,
and reportable quantities of residuals. For the original draft, see Hazardous Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals
from Electric Utilities and CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designation and Reportable Quantities,
EPA (Oct. 16 2009), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA2009-0640-0013 [hereinafter Initial EPA Proposal]. The second version includes red-lining
incorporated during reviews by and negotiations with OIRA. Hazardous and Solid Waste
Management System; Identification and Listing of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion
Residuals from Electric Utilities, EPA (May 3, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0012. The two versions of the draft
proposal are available in an online docket of federal regulation material. Hazardous and Solid
Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/
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the rule, the episode reinforced the strong impression left by Sunstein’s
appointment that the transition from the George W. Bush administration
to the Obama administration did not mark a significant change in the most
important outcomes of centralized regulatory review of individual rules.
In response to the one-billion-gallon coal ash spill in Kingston, Tennessee, EPA decided that federal regulation would be necessary to eliminate
those hazards, forwarding a proposed rule to OIRA in October 2009. That
document, referred to here as the “Initial EPA Proposal,” would have regulated coal ash as a hazardous waste, emphasizing two justifications for
ramping up disposal controls: (1) the migration of toxic constituents of the
ash into the environment, especially groundwater, and (2) the recurrence of
spills like the one in Kingston.261
Regulating coal ash destined for land disposal as a “hazardous waste”
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)262 will change
industry practices in three ways. First, the operators of coal-fired power
plants would be compelled to send the ash to landfills and surface
impoundments that comply with more protective design requirements,
including the installation of liners, impermeable (rain-proof) covers, and
leachate detection systems. Second, EPA would craft those design standards, although state regulators would remain responsible for enforcing
individual facility permits in most places. Finally, federal or state regulators
would supervise the closure of coal ash dump sites that no longer qualify
for disposal because they lack these protective features.263
EPA estimates that approximately 495 electric plants generated 136
million tons of ash in 2008.264 Utilities disposed of about 34% (46 million
tons) in so-called “dry” landfills that cover deposits so that rainfall cannot
infiltrate them; around 22% (29.4 million tons) went into surface impoundments like the one at Kingston; some 37% (50.1 million tons) was
“beneficially reused”; and nearly 8% went into the shafts of abandoned coal
mines.265
The “beneficial” reuses that consume 50.1 million tons of coal ash
annually include everything from applying the ash to agriculture lands,
#!docketDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640 (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Docket
on Coal Ash].
261.
Initial EPA Proposal, supra note 260, at 72–76. For a description of the coal ash
spill, see supra Part I.B.4.
262.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f (2006 &
Supp. II 2008).
263.
Comments from Ctr. for Progressive Reform on Proposed Rulemaking on Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities 3 (Nov. 19, 2010), http://
www.progressivereform.org/articles/Coal_Ash_Comments_Steinzor_111910.pdf.
264.
Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg.
35,128, 35,151 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
265.
Id.
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using it in concrete, placing it in road beds before concrete is poured, and
using it as a filler material for wall board.266 In theory at least, recycling
practices that reuse coal ash safely have significant social benefits, not only
because they avoid disposal of the waste in dumpsites that could leak or
collapse, but because they make unnecessary the consumption of virgin
materials that require expensive processing before they are used. Unfortunately, EPA has not yet reached the question of what kinds of recycling
options are truly “beneficial” for human health and the environment.
Instead, the agency has sidestepped this question in both its initial proposal
and in the proposal that emerged from OIRA’s review by deciding that
whenever a utility claims to be reusing coal ash, such practices would be
exempt from any further regulation under RCRA.267
In May 2010, a fundamentally changed proposal emerged from OIRA.
Rather than sticking with a single proposal, the rulemaking notice advanced
three alternatives: (1) adopting EPA’s original option that coal ash be regulated as a RCRA Subtitle C hazardous waste;268 (2) shifting back to an
approach that would treat coal ash as a “solid” waste under RCRA Subtitle
D269 when it is disposed on land, essentially leaving all regulatory decisions
and enforcement to state discretion; and (3) implementing a so-called “D
prime” option that would allow all existing coal ash disposal landfills and
surface impoundments to continue to function without change for the
remainder of their useful life.270 This transformation of a strongly protective proposal into an equivocal offering of alternatives, two of which would
not significantly alter the status quo, offers a disturbing picture of how
OIRA operates on both procedural and substantive grounds. The coal ash
episode, which remains unresolved, demonstrates a review process and an
institution that has not changed either its orientation or outcomes during
the four decades of its existence.

266.
For an industry perspective, see AM. COAL COUNCIL, COAL ASH: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL WINDFALL (2010), available at http://www.americancoalcouncil.org/
associations/10586/files/coal_ash_env_econ_windfall.pdf; AM. COAL COUNCIL, COAL ASH:
BENEFICIAL REUSE (2010), available at http://www.americancoalcouncil.org/associations/
10586/files/coal_ash_beneficial_resource.pdf.
267.
Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at
35,128.
268.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f (2006 &
Supp. II 2008).
269.
Id. §§ 6941–6949.
270.
The Federal Register notice setting forth these options only admits to two alternatives, although it explicitly raises the third, minimally protective proposal, calling it the
“[subtitle] ‘D prime’ ” approach. Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric
Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,134.
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Procedural Issues: Dominance by Industry and Hostile “Sister”
Agencies
Although the original EPA coal ash proposal was never made public (as
far as I can tell),271 rumors about its content generated an intense industry
lobbying campaign before OIRA. The OIRA staff sat through forty-seven
separate meetings with organizational representatives interested in the EPA
proposal.272 Approximately two-thirds of these meetings were with industry
and state representatives opposing the rule and one-third were with representatives of environmental groups supporting the rule.273 The meetings
amounted to thirty percent of the 142 meetings that OIRA had held since the
advent of the Obama administration, an astonishing percentage because
OIRA is responsible for reviewing all the proposed and final rules generated
by the vast majority of federal agencies and departments.274
The claim that this elaborate, OIRA-run process enhances the fairness
of rulemaking is contradicted by the reality that it benefits industrial entities that can afford to field a large cadre of legal and technical experts and
lobbyists. A study I conducted with colleagues at the Center for Progressive
Reform (CPR) examined each of the 6,194 separate OIRA “reviews” of
regulatory proposals and final rules between October 16, 2001, when it first
began to post notices of meetings held with outside parties on the internet,
and June 1, 2011, when we ended our research.275 During this roughly tenyear period, OIRA officials met 1,080 times with 5,759 participants.276 Our
analysis showed that 65% of the attendees at these meetings represented
industry, about five times the number of people who appeared on behalf of
public interest groups.277 A surprising 442 of the 1,080 meetings involved
regulatory matters that originated at EPA even though the agency accounted
for only 11% of the matters reviewed by OIRA.278 According to its own
271.
I spoke to virtually every reporter who covered the controversy and every representative of a public interest group who worked on the issue; no one had a copy of the
original proposal until it was posted on the EPA docket on May 6, 2010.
272.
Meeting Records, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
oira_2050_meetings/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
273.
See James Goodwin, Eye on OIRA: Coal Ash Meetings Up to 42, CPR BLOG (Apr. 5,
2010, 11:12 AM), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=CE877002A1A5-ADAC-34017AC4184F218A; see also Meeting Records, supra note 272.
274.
Goodwin, supra note 273. Again, only independent agencies are exempt from
OIRA review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994).
275.
RENA STEINZOR ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMP PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
WORKER SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (2011), available at http://www.
progressivereform.org/articles/OIRA_Meetings_1111.pdf.
276.
Id.
277.
Id. at 8.
278.
Id. at 9.
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internal figures, OIRA changed 84% of the rules forwarded by EPA, in
comparison to a 65% change rate for other agencies.279
Controversial rulemaking proposals often generate wide participation
throughout the White House. For example, research by Professors Lisa
Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh found that as many as nineteen offices
became involved in OIRA’s reviews during the George H. W. Bush and
Clinton administrations.280 For reasons that are unclear, rather than asking
the agencies to submit their own individual comments on a rulemaking,
OIRA has taken upon itself the job of holding the pen in these disputes,
drafting a set of “inter-agency comments” that are forwarded to the rulemaking
agency. At least in theory, a balanced set of comments from other agencies
and departments, some favoring strong environmental protections and others
opposing it, is consistent with the notice and comment structure established
by the Administrative Procedure Act.281 But in direct contravention of the
instructions contained in Executive Order 12,866,282 OIRA follows a strict
policy of keeping inter-agency comments confidential. Indeed, release of
inter-agency comments in the coal ash rulemaking occurred only because
EPA decided on its own to post them on the web, immediately triggering a
behind-closed-doors dispute within the Obama administration. The comments were briefly removed from the site, then rapidly re-posted within a
few hours, accompanied by the following notice:
The below document was posted on this public site in error by
EPA. Interagency comments on draft rules by federal agencies under Executive Order 12866 remain confidential to protect the
integrity of the deliberative process. Because this document was
279.
Id.
280.
Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 68 (2006). Those
offices included:
Chief of Staff, Legislative Affairs, Public Liaison, Intergovernmental Liaison,
Press Secretary (including Communications), White House Counsel, Domestic
Policy Counsel, National Economic Council, Political Affairs, Office of the Vice
President (including the Council on Competitiveness in the [G. H. W. Bush] administration), Office of Policy Development, Office of Management and Budget
(other than OIRA), Council of Economic Advisors, Council on Environmental
Quality, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and the National Security Council.
Id. at 64 n.107.
281.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)–553(b) (2006).
282.
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2010) (stating that, following the completion of its review and publication of a
rule in the Federal Register or when the rule is “otherwise issued to the public,” OIRA “shall
make available to the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency”
during its review).
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inadvertently disclosed, EPA has decided, in this instance and with
the agreement of the agencies, to allow the document to remain in
the docket.283
One additional reality underscores the negative implications of OIRA’s
approach to inter-agency comments. Because Congress has decreed that all
of the major pollution control statutes apply equally to entities operated by
the United States,284 EPA’s proposals often affect the activities and budget
expenditures of federal actors.285 Giving federal agencies and departments
an inside, confidential track on influencing rulemakings creates a fundamental conflict of interest.
This troubling state of affairs was on full display during the coal ash
rulemaking. The Tennessee Valley Authority, the federal power company
responsible for the Kingston spill, was treated as a confidential federal
partner by OIRA, as were the Department of Transportation, a builder of
highways using recycled coal ash, and the Department of Energy, which is
often allied with electric utilities.286 In the end, federal opponents of the
coal ash proposal took on the features of a posse in a classic western, riding
to support the OIRA sheriff’s pursuit of the outlaw EPA.

Substantive Issues: The Stigma Effect
When EPA sent its draft rulemaking proposal to OIRA for review, the
documentation included a Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (Draft RIA)
totaling about 165 pages;287 by the time the proposal emerged, this analysis
had grown to 242 pages and predicted that the negative benefits of EPA’s
preferred option could outweigh its positive social value by hundreds of

283.
Interagency Working Comments on Draft Rule Under EO 12866, EPA,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0350 (last
visited Aug. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Interagency Comments on Draft EPA Coal Ash Rule].
284.
Clean Water Act § 502(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (2006); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act § 1004(15), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (2006); Clean Air Act § 302(e), 42
U.S.C. § 7602(e) (2006).
285.
See, e.g., Christopher Gozdor et al., Where the Streets Have No Name: The Collision
of Environmental Law and Information Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
Law Inst.) 10,978 (2003); Kyle E. McSlarrow, The Department of Defense Environmental
Cleanup Program: Application of State Standards to Federal Facilities After SARA, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,120 (1987).
286.
See Interagency Comments on Draft EPA Coal Ash Rule, supra note 283, at 1 (noting
that these entities were contributors to the confidential process of commenting on draft
rules).
287.
MARK EADS, EPA, OMB REVIEW DRAFT: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
EPA’S PROPOSED REGULATION OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES GENERATED BY THE
ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!
documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0010.
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billions of dollars.288 The central methodology introduced to produce this
dramatic set of numbers is a peculiar application of behavioral economics.
Industry opponents argue that the strong EPA Subtitle C proposal
would create a “stigma effect” that would ruin the recycling market because
consumers of the recycled ash would be too frightened to keep buying the
material if it would be treated as hazardous when it was not recycled but
instead dumped into a pit in the ground.289 This fear would be inspired by
the possible threat of a lawsuit at some point in the future when, for example, someone discovered that coal ash had been laid in the foundation of
a highway, mixed with concrete, or used as filler in wallboard. Because
industry representatives definitely do not concede that coal ash is in fact
hazardous to public health or the environment, this anticipated litigation
presumably would fail when plaintiffs could not prove that the ash had
caused them any harm. Regardless, the fear itself would be enough to
destroy the beneficial reuse market even if no lawsuit was ever won.290
Consequently, electric utilities would incur two new expenses: the fees
imposed for significantly more expensive disposal alternatives and the costs
of virgin materials needed to replace the coal ash that was previously used
in such applications.291 OIRA’s quantification of these hypothetical costs in
the Final Draft RIA ran to $233.5 billion in negative, or lost, economic and
environmental benefits at the high end of a range of estimates.292 The
OIRA economists assumed that if the strict EPA rule went into effect,
approximately fifty-one percent of coal ash that is now recycled—some 37
million tons—would be diverted to disposal in 2012, growing to about 41
million tons annually by 2061.293 The assumption that the stigma effect
would reduce the total amount of beneficial use by fifty percent was a “reasonable approximation in the absense [sic] of information to the

288.
See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR EPA’S PROPOSED RCRA
REGULATION OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES (CCR) GENERATED BY THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY 10–12 (2010) [hereinafter FINAL DRAFT RIA], available at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0003.
289.
Cf. FINAL DRAFT RIA, supra note 288, at 8 (noting that although EPA received
many stakeholder letters alleging a market stigma, EPA does not believe on the basis of its
past experience with hazardous waste regulations that market stigma will occur).
290.
This assertion further depends on the idea that plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely file
losing lawsuits in the hope of a nuisance settlement; this is also a questionable assertion, but
one that is beyond the scope of this Article.
291.
FINAL DRAFT RIA, supra note 288, at 174, 177. The results of OIRA’s number
crunching are summarized in the Appendix infra.
292.
FINAL DRAFT RIA, supra note 288, at 11 exhibit 6, 187–88 Exhibit 5C-21.
293.
Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg.
35,128 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
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contrary”294—or, in other words, the number is based on an assumption
that cannot be disproved.
The Final Draft RIA admits that academic studies of stigma rarely
produce such dramatic effects but does not cite examples of such research.295
Curious about the absence of citations, I traced the concept back to the
behavioral science literature,296 which includes a series of interesting studies
that define stigma as people’s revulsion against substances or practices that
could prove harmful to their health.297 In one famous experiment, research
subjects were asked to drink juice after a “sterilized” cockroach had been
dipped in the filled glass; most refused all such requests.298 Behavioral
scientists have also studied reactions to polychlorinated biphenyls in milk,
the ramifications of mad cow disease for the British beef industry, and the
impact of the 1982 Tylenol tampering incident on future sales, all providing similar results: the average person exhibits revulsion over the
contamination and is anxious to avoid exposure.299 What is interesting and
important about this literature, though, are the conclusions the researchers
reach about the best solutions to stigma. They recommend confronting the
threat with public education, efforts to restore trust in government, and—
ultimately—more protective regulation.300 In other words, the behavioral
science
literature—as opposed to the behavioral economics literature—focuses on
average consumers’ response to risks beyond their control, as opposed to
294.
EPA, APPENDIX FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR EPA’S PROPOSED
RCRA REGULATION OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES (CCR) GENERATED BY THE
ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 333 n.2 (2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0003. This appendix to the final draft
analysis may also be accessed through Docket on Coal Ash, supra note 260.
295.
FINAL DRAFT RIA, supra note 288, at 176 n.158.
296.
The best overall “reader” on the subject is RISK, MEDIA AND STIGMA:
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (James
Flynn et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter RISK AND STIGMA].
297.
See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Defining Stigma, in RISK AND STIGMA, supra note 296,
at 361, 361 (defining stigma as the “refusal to engage in an act that would otherwise be
acceptable”); Robin Gregory et al., Technological Stigma, in RISK AND STIGMA, supra note
296, at 3, 19 (defining stigma as something “different, deviant, flawed or undesirable”).
298.
Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from the Study of Contagion, in
RISK AND STIGMA, supra note 296, at 31, 31–33.
299.
Michael R. Edelstein, Crying over Spoiled Milk: Contamination, Visibility, and
Expectation in Environmental Stigma, in RISK AND STIGMA, supra note 296, at 41, 41–68;
Douglas Powell, Mad Cow Disease and the Stigmatization of British Beef, in RISK AND STIGMA,
supra note 296, at 219, 219–28; Mark L. Mitchell, The Impact of External Parties on BrandName Capital: The 1982 Tylenol Poisonings and Subsequent Cases, in RISK AND STIGMA, supra
note 296, at 203, 203–17.
300.
Gregory et al., supra note 297, at 3, 7; Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Coping
with Stigma: Challenges and Opportunities, in RISK AND STIGMA, supra note 296, at 331, 341;
Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, in RISK AND STIGMA, supra note 296, at 87, 105.
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sophisticated industry executives’ feigned reactions to risks that are well
within their control.
The coal ash proposal marks the first time that an industry’s fear of
liability is not only quantified but central to the formulation of an environmental rulemaking proposal.301 Should OIRA continue this effort to
apply behavioral economics more widely, the inevitable result will be
weaker—and fewer—rules.
EPA’s comment period on its coal ash proposal closed on November 19,
2010. The agency is now in the throes of analyzing the thousands of pages
of information, complaints, opinions, objections, exhortations, and threats
of dire consequences that pack its Internet-based docket.302 Even if EPA
decides to stay the course and support its original proposal, it must endure
another round of OIRA’s scrutiny. And it must overcome the use of behavioral economics to produce a crunching of numbers that heavily skews the
outcome of the rulemaking toward the weaker regulatory alternatives. EPA
Administrator Jackson told a House of Representatives appropriations
subcommittee that the agency will not issue a final rule regulating coal ash
in 2011.303

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRALIZED REVIEW
A. One-way Ratchet
The forty-year history of centralized White House regulatory review—
from its genesis in the Nixon White House to its institutionalization during
the Reagan administration and OIRA’s continued operation during four
subsequent administrations—presents compelling evidence that OIRA
operates as a one-way ratchet toward weaker rules.304 This identity is confirmed by the obvious trust that industry representatives exhibit in OIRA’s
capacity to protect their interests.305

301.
Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg.
35,128, 35,186 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.)
(“Beneficially used CCRs are the same material as that which would be considered hazardous; this asymmetry increases confusion and the probability of lawsuits, however,
unwarranted . . . .”).
302.
As of August 25, 2011, the docket contains 11,843 separate documents. The pages
listing their titles number 1,185. Docket Folder Summary for Docket EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-06-40,
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-20090640 (last visited August 25, 2011).
303.
Avery Fellow, Jackson Says EPA Will Not Issue Final Regulation on Coal Ash in 2011,
42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 493 (Mar. 11, 2011).
304.
See supra Part II.
305.
See supra notes 275–279 and accompanying text.
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It would be a remarkable set of circumstances indeed if such a powerful
office developed a deregulatory reputation, its leadership and alumni felt
they were being unfairly accused, and everyone neglected to correct the
public record. One former OIRA Administrator has undertaken this challenge, doing his best to portray OIRA’s role as neutral and arguing that at
times, it weakens rules, but at other times, it supports stronger regulation.
In an article entitled Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, John Graham cites three instances of what he describes as “lifesaving
regulation” that OIRA “advocated” between 2001–06 while he served as its
Administrator.306 These examples do not stand up to scrutiny and, in any
event, represent an exceedingly small universe of OIRA’s interventions.
The first is the reduction of diesel exhaust.307 OIRA under Graham
solicited comments from industry and conservative groups on which
regulations that had emerged from the Clinton administration should be
re-evaluated by President George W. Bush.308 The Mercatus Center, a rightwing think tank headquartered at George Mason University, complained
about EPA’s fairly strong rule requiring reductions from diesel engines used
on-road in, for example, long-haul trucks. But OIRA disagreed, concluding
that, because the benefits exceeded the costs by a ratio of sixteen to one, it
would support EPA.309 This enthusiasm for diesel engine reductions,
Graham explains, extended to a joint EPA/OIRA effort to draft new rules
on emissions reductions in off-road vehicles used in agriculture, construction,
and mining.310 Quite apart from the strangeness of the claim that it was a
victory for the environment and public to have EPA partnering with OIRA
on a rule that EPA had full authority to undertake on its own, Graham fails
to report that the rule was delayed when OIRA forced EPA to undertake
an elaborate cost-benefit analysis to justify it.311
Graham’s second example involves OIRA’s role in helping to craft the
George W. Bush administration’s “Clear Skies” proposal outlining legislation to amend the Clean Air Act.312 Left out of his analysis is the political
reality that the Clear Skies proposal was widely viewed as weakening the
Clean Air Act’s existing requirements and was dismissed by Democratic

306.
Graham, supra note 199, at 465–80.
307.
Id. at 466–69.
308.
Id. at 467.
309.
Id.
310.
Id. at 468.
311.
Mike Ferullo, Reports from Environmental Groups Pan Bush Administration’s Regulatory Decisions, 33 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 249 (Feb. 1, 2002) (“Rules sent back to EPA for
‘improved analysis’ include a proposal for first-time emission limits on snowmobiles, recreational boats, and other nonroad vehicles . . . .”); Dean Scott, Former Administrator Says Bush
Administration Threatens EPA Independence, 35 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 911 (Apr. 23, 2004).
312.
Graham, supra note 199 at 469–74.
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congressional leaders and environmentalists.313 When it became obvious
that Clear Skies was off the congressional agenda, EPA was compelled to
fulfill its existing statutory mandate by crafting a new rule to diminish
sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions from power plants; Graham counts
OIRA’s “clearing” of this rule as proof that it sometimes supports affirmative
regulation.314 Acquiescing to an expert agency’s interpretation of a statutory
mandate should be routine at OIRA. Claiming it as a notable, positive
event actually confirms the suspicion that OIRA’s usual practice is to view
any EPA rule, regardless of statutory origin, with suspicion.
Graham’s final example concerns vehicle fuel efficiency standards. A
loophole in the original standards exempting “light trucks” from
fuel-efficiency requirements was the genesis of the sports utility vehicle:
manufacturers simply took light truck beds and lowered passenger compartments onto them without redesigning the vehicle as a whole.315 The result
was a vehicle that was exempt from fuel-efficiency standards, with a relatively narrow and elevated wheel base and a top-heavy passenger space that
caused it to be susceptible to rollovers. Tired of waiting for federal regulators to plug the light truck loophole, the State of California announced that
it would take advantage of its authority under the Clean Air Act to issue a
more stringent fuel-efficiency standard than what the federal government
required.316 Graham’s efforts to help other Bush administration officials to
out-maneuver this threat are the gist of his claim that OIRA was
pro-regulation in this context. He does not mention that, had California
succeeded, other states would soon have followed suit, and manufacturers
would have been compelled to sell more fuel-efficient vehicles nationwide.317
Beyond Graham’s anecdotal evidence, surprisingly few empirical studies
of the effect of OIRA’s review on the substance of individual rules are
available. The best is one by Professor David Driesen, who undertook a
comprehensive review of the scholarly literature and other studies and
313.
See, e.g., David Hawkins, Dir., NRDC Climate Ctr., Testimony at the United
States Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air,
Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety, Hearings on S. 385, “Clear Skies Act of 2003” (Apr. 8,
2003), available at http://epw.senate.gov/108th/Hawkins_040803.htm.
314.
Graham, supra note 199, at 472.
315.
Interview by Frontline with Keith Bradsher, Reporter, N.Y. Times (July 2001),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rollover/interviews/bradsher.html.
316.
Graham, supra note 199, at 475. California’s authority to adopt more stringent
requirements is provided by section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). For an
excellent explanation of how these provisions operate, see JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 34099, CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE
GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2007), available at http://www.bayareanewsgroup.com/
multimedia/mn/news/CRSCalWaiver.pdf.
317.
See Susan A. Baird, EPA Blocks California Car-Pollution Standards, PROVIDENCE
BUS. NEWS (Dec. 20, 2007), https://www.pbn.com/EPA-blocks-California-car-pollutionstandard-,28872.
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reports documenting the impact of OIRA’s review, concluding that the
process routinely slowed and reduced the stringency of environmental,
safety, and health regulation.318 In the empirical portion of his research,
Driesen examined twenty-five rules identified by a GAO study as significantly affected by OIRA’s review in 2001–02,319 finding that OIRA’s
recommended changes reduced regulatory protections with respect to twentyfour of the rules, while the one remaining change was neutral.320
Professors Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh interviewed thirtyfive top EPA presidential (i.e., Senate-confirmed) appointees: fourteen from
the George H.W. Bush administration and twenty-one from the Clinton
administration.321 Their analysis, based on a lengthy survey composed of 107
questions and administered by the authors in person or over the telephone,
focused on the nature of White House staff participation in regulatory
review.322 What is especially noteworthy about this survey is that because it
involved the perceptions of political appointees—not career civil servants—
respondents were significantly more likely to be sympathetic to the president’s efforts to control the bureaucracy. On the basis of the survey results,
Bressman and Vandenbergh concluded that OIRA’s review “regularly skews
rulemaking in a deregulatory direction” and that OIRA uses “cost-benefit
analysis to impose its own normative preference for deregulation.”323
Bressman and Vandenbergh warn that the haphazard and nontransparent consultations between agency staff and White House officials
could undermine the more orderly process followed by the agencies in
adopting a rule, including putting proposals out for public comment,
analyzing the comments, and modifying the rules accordingly:
It is not a sufficient response to say that the president gets involved
in agency decision-making when he wants the public to understand
that he is responsible for particular agency policies or rules. Even if
such behavior promotes accountability on a limited basis, the concern is that it may not promote rationality in a systematic way, as
a model of agency decision-making should.324

318.
David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335,
400–03 (2006).
319.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-1163T, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE
IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS
(2003).
320.
Driesen, supra note 318, at 365.
321.
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 62–91.
322.
Id. at 63–64.
323.
Id. at 50.
324.
Id. at 70.
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A third study, conducted by Professor Steven Croley, involved an examination of paper records regarding meetings held by OIRA between 1993 and
2000.325 Croley characterized the nature of the outside interest groups that
met with OIRA staff, but his categories were so expansive that the figures
he developed are not very useful. For example, he described all “business
firms” and “trade associations” as “narrow” interests and all public interest
groups as “broad-based” interests.326 But if OIRA had several meetings
with both types of groups regarding a rule, even if the number of meetings
with industry groups far exceeded the meetings with public interest groups,
the meetings were coded as a single instance of so-called “pluralistic” meetings.327 Accordingly, Croley would categorize the forty-seven meetings that
OIRA held on the coal ash rule, the overwhelming majority of which
involved industry representatives, as a single pluralistic meeting.328
Croley then compared the number of rules subject to change by OIRA
with the number of meetings held with the different types of groups, concluding that “the White House changed a disproportionately high number
of rules that were the subject of meetings only with broad-based groups,
though not to a statistically significant extent.”329 He interpreted this
observation as a “finding at odds with any simple picture of White House
review according to which the White House delivers regulatory favors
to economically powerful interest groups while ignoring broad-based
interests.”330 In fact, his questionable methodology undermines any such
conclusion or, for that matter, any definitive judgment about the substance
of OIRA’s interventions in rulemaking over time.
Without seeing the paperwork that agencies like EPA send over to
OIRA (“before” documents), and then reviewing the text of the rules and
rule proposals that are produced as a result of OIRA’s review (“after” documents), it is difficult to determine with specificity what changes OIRA is
responsible for making. In direct violation of the clear instructions contained in section 6(b)(4) of Executive Order 12,866, OIRA does not make
“before” and “after” documents available to the public.331 They only become
325.
Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003).
326.
Id. at 853.
327.
Id.
328.
Meeting Records, supra note 272.
329.
Croley, supra note 325, at 860.
330.
Id.
331.
That provision requires that after a regulatory action is published in the Federal
Register, or after an agency or department has announced its decision not to publish or issue
this regulatory action, OIRA “shall make available to the public all documents exchanged
between OIRA and the agency during the review by OIRA under this section.” Exec. Order No.
12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1994) (emphasis added). The failure to disclose was
noted in a letter a group of CPR scholars sent to White House Counsel on March 17, 2010,
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available if the agency responsible for the rule posts the documents on its
website, as EPA did with respect to coal ash.332 Nevertheless, as Professor
Croley’s study illustrates, rates of change in rules and rule proposals that
were subject to a significant number of meetings with industry representatives is a rough proxy for the influence of demands that rules be
weakened.333 CPR used this proxy in its more fine-grained analysis of
OIRA’s interventions, reaching the same conclusion.334
For all of these reasons, any close observer of OIRA’s behavior over
time would be hard pressed to assert that it ever takes a consistently neutral
approach to the policy choices presented by rulemaking in the arena of
health, worker safety, and environmental protection, even under chief executives with a more moderate approach to these issues, such as Presidents
Clinton and Obama. Instead, the sheer weight of its history, culture, and
professional composition maintain its instinctive hostility toward such
protective requirements.
As troubling as OIRA’s historical track record with respect to individual rules may be from a public interest perspective, it is relatively old
news. OIRA’s fans justify the phenomenon as a necessary counterweight to
unbridled agency advocacy.335 I have argued here that OIRA’s operation as a
one-way ratchet is unacceptable, not least because its activities undermine
the clear intent of ambitious, protective statutes in a process that is hidden
from the public view. A far preferable way for conservatives to accomplish
such changes in a democratic, federalist republic would be to garner the
votes to amend these laws. If they cannot, or if Congress is too dysfunctional and polarized to make such lawmaking practical, the least OIRA can
do is to be transparent and tread carefully with respect to statutory mandates. Otherwise, as Professor Nina Mendelson points out, the political
reasons for certain choices are made less—not more—transparent by
OIRA’s interventions.336
Regardless of how this long-running dialogue plays out in the future,
my case for terminating centralized review does not rest solely, or even
primarily, on these grounds. If the agencies were up and running, unfetbut we never received a response. See Letter from Bd. of Dirs., Ctr. for Progressive Reform,
to Robert Bauer, White House Counsel, The White House (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.
progressivereform.org/articles/WH_Counsel_re_OIRA_March2010.pdf.
332.
See supra notes 287–288 and accompanying text.
333.
Croley, supra note 325. Very occasionally, industries that make pollution control
equipment or other clean technologies might suggest strengthening a rule, but these episodes are sufficiently anomalous as to have no meaningful effect on either Croley’s or CPR’s
analyses.
334.
See supra note 275.
335.
See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14; Hahn & Litan, supra note 14.
336.
See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010).
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tered by political interference and possessing adequate funding to pursue
their statutory mandates effectively, the balancing argument might be more
convincing. But that relatively healthy state of affairs is a distant memory.
Given the widening incidence of agency dysfunction and regulatory failure,
the more important and unrecognized implication of regulatory review is
the significant lost opportunity costs that OIRA imposes on the American
public.

B. Lost Opportunity Costs
Lost opportunity costs are the direct product of OIRA’s myopic role as
the White House’s window on the regulatory world. By squarely occupying
the space within the Executive Branch that is concerned with regulatory
policy, OIRA forestalls other players from taking the initiative and acting
to remedy agency dysfunction. In effect, the White House drives blind
with respect to the acute funding shortfalls that threaten the viability of the
protector agencies. The President’s centralized domestic policy-making
staff has never acknowledged that health, safety, and environmental agencies need stronger legal authority, especially with respect to enforcement, to
accomplish their missions. When crises like the Deepwater Horizon spill
erupt, the White House staff and the President are forced to react. But
those reactions do not appear to be informed by any comprehensive analysis
of why the agencies fail to prevent such catastrophes and, as important,
what reforms are needed to ensure that these disasters do not occur again.
OIRA’s single-minded focus on individual regulations, and its fierce
assertion of the power to oversee the entire regulatory system, also means
that the White House has failed to respond to a series of cross-cutting
problems that affect several agencies and can only be addressed through
affirmative policy-making at the highest levels. So, for example, consistent
with its institutional bias, OIRA is preoccupied with ensuring that federal
agencies and departments opposed to a regulatory proposal have ample
opportunity to condemn it behind closed doors, drafting “inter-agency
comments” that are withheld from the public.337 Recently, it convened an
inter-agency group to establish a uniform economic estimate of the social
costs of carbon emissions for the purposes of cost-benefit analyses of rules
that have a potential impact on climate change.338 But its recorded history
contains no indication that it has ever convened agencies to develop
337.
See supra Part II.E.3.
338.
Details of the membership of the taskforce and its deliberations were never made
public. For a discussion of the merits of its conclusions, see FRANK ACKERMAN &
ELIZABETH STANTON, ECONS. FOR EQUITY & ENV’T, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 2–4
(2010), available at http://realclimateeconomics.org/briefs/Ackerman_Social_Cost_of_
Carbon.pdf.
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an affirmative proposal that would address industrial practices that harm
public health, worker safety, or the environment and that fall within the
jurisdiction of more than one agency.
The best contemporary example of a neglected, cross-cutting problem
is the growing threat posed by imported consumer products. America and
other developed countries have largely exported their manufacturing footprints abroad, especially to China and other developing countries in SouthSoutheast Asia. The value of Chinese imports in the U.S. marketplace is
estimated to be approximately $246 billion, about forty percent of the value
of total imports. Yet China’s behemoth economy lacks effective regulatory
controls at the national level, and the complex supply chains that go into
producing a final product create ample economic incentives for adulteration
or the use of tainted ingredients.339 U.S. regulators are overmatched by
the scope and size of the problem, and an effective, cross-cutting solution
to these circumstances is not even a glimmer on the horizon.340
One of the most prominent episodes of food adulteration involved
melamine, an industrial chemical used in the manufacture of plastic that
causes kidney failure. In 2008, Chinese “milk merchants” added the chemical to raw milk they received from farmers in order to boost the apparent
protein content of milk products.341 A small amount of the tainted milk
made it into infant formula and candy sold in America.342 The incident
prompted reforms of the Chinese Food and Drug Administration, but, as
Professor Richard Suttmeier, an expert on that country’s product safety
problems, observed to the Christian Science Monitor, some 500,000 food
producing and processing companies exist in China, making it extraordinarily
difficult for the Chinese government—much less the U.S. government—to
regulate them effectively.343
Another example involves over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate—a chemical
with lethal side effects—that was used to mimic the more expensive
heparin which is used as a blood thinner for kidney dialysis patients.344
339.
For a thoughtful analysis of the lack of effective national safety regulation in
China and the confounding problem of dangerous imports, see Jacques deLisle, The Other
China Trade Deficit: Export Safety Problems and Responses, in IMPORT SAFETY, supra note 1, at
22, 22–49.
340.
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et al., Consumer Protection in an Era of Globalization, in
IMPORT SAFETY, supra note 1, at 3, 3–21; see also Jyoti Thottam, The Growing Dangers of the
China Trade, TIME, July 9, 2007, at 29.
341.
Peter Ford, Behind Bad Baby Milk, an Ethical Gap in China’s Business, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 17, 2008, at 1 (reporting that the milk merchants had sold the adulterated product to Sanlu, a Chinese state-owned company engaged in a joint venture with a
New Zealand dairy cooperative).
342.
Trace Melamine Found in U.S. Baby Formula, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 1:57 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/26/world/main4633848.shtml.
343.
Id.
344.
Favole & Mundy, supra note 1.

Spring 2012]

The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review

275

After American patients exhibited acute, sometimes fatal, allergic reactions,
the FDA traced the problem back to its source: two Chinese companies
that shipped contaminated heparin to the United States between 2007 and
2008, escaping discovery by their American business partners.345 Some
eighty percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used by American
drug manufacturers are imported.346 Congress complained bitterly about
the FDA’s handling of the heparin incident, especially the limited inspections
that the agency was able to conduct at foreign manufacturing facilities.347
According to a 2009 GAO report placing FDA oversight of drug imports
among a small group of “high risk”—or failing—programs governmentwide, the agency does not have a firm grip on how many foreign firms
actually produce drugs or drug ingredients for the U.S. market and inspects
the firms it has identified at a rate of only eight percent annually.348
On July 18, 2007, President George W. Bush issued an executive order
convening an inter-agency taskforce to study the import problem.349 But
the taskforce spent barely three months on this complex problem, issuing a
report in November 2007 that recommended a series of reforms, many of
which either required legislative action or the creation of new, unfunded
administrative programs that were never pursued by either the Bush or
Obama administrations.350 As an indication of the lack of seriousness of
this effort, the cover letter from Michael Leavitt, then Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, said that in the three months
between the executive order and the report’s issuance, “the State Department has led a vigorous international outreach effort to communicate our
import safety priorities with our trade partners around the world.”351 In
such a short period of time, consultation could not have occurred on more
than a cursory level with a small handful of countries.
Ensuring the safety of food, drug, and consumer products imported
from developing countries with weak central governments and no effective
regulatory infrastructure is an extraordinarily challenging problem. Twelve
American agencies share jurisdiction over food safety with sometimes over-

345.
346.

Id.
Coglianese et al., Consumer Protection in an Era of Globalization, in IMPORT
SAFETY, supra note 1, at 3, 5.
347.
Id.
348.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-271, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN
UPDATE 16–17, 37 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09271.pdf.
349.
Exec. Order No. 13,439, 3 C.F.R. 227 (2008).
350.
See INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON IMPORT SAFETY, ACTION PLAN FOR
IMPORT SAFETY: A ROADMAP FOR CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT 10–41 (2007), available at
http://archive.hhs.gov/importsafety/report/actionplan.pdf.
351.
Id.
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lapping authority.352 The United States cannot inspect its way out of this
problem. It may not even be able to enforce its way out of the problem,
although stringent criminal penalties for importers of tainted or unsafe products would be one way to motivate the creation of a third-party inspection
system.353 Nevertheless, no matter how compelling the need for regulation,
other countries could challenge such solutions as unwarranted barriers to
trade.354
Because so many domestic agencies, private sector stakeholders, the
Department of State, and the U.S. Trade Representative have interest in
and expertise to offer in addressing the import problem and are unlikely to
convene—much less manage to agree on viable solutions—on their own, the
White House must take the lead in making import safety a priority and
hammering out a workable system of short- and long-term solutions.
OIRA’s small staff of economists, trained in the intricacies of cost-benefit
analysis, steeped in the negative culture that pervades centralized review,
and accustomed to mustering agencies to attack proposals rather than solve
problems, is ill-equipped to undertake such a complex and challenging
initiative. But because OIRA exists, and has the regulatory system as its
portfolio, no other White House office has stepped into this growing
breach. Further delays in coping with unsafe imports can fairly be laid at
OIRA’s doorstep.

C. If Not OIRA, What?
We come at last to the question of what should replace OIRA’s brand
of centralized review. The scope of this Article would be exceeded by a
detailed explication of how a new framework should be implemented and,
in any event, such details should probably be left to people familiar with
the inner workings of the White House staff. But the overarching goals of
this recommendation are quite straightforward: White House staff should
stop reviewing individual rules and rule proposals on a routine basis, instead
delegating this responsibility to the political appointees who lead the agencies and are already accountable for making wise and balanced decisions.
On the other hand, some group of the White House staff should assume
responsibility for dealing with cross-cutting issues; depending on the depth
and persistence of the problem, these assignments should be made on either
a permanent or an ad hoc basis.
352.
Coglianese et al., Consumer Protection in an Era of Globalization, in IMPORT
SAFETY, supra note 1, at 3, 12.
353.
See Rena Steinzor, High Crimes, Not Misdemeanors: Deterring the Production of
Unsafe Food, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 175 (2010).
354.
For further discussion, see Tracey Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock, Import Safety
Regulation and International Trade, in IMPORT SAFETY, supra note 1, at 69, 69–87.
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This proposal stops short of urging the abolition of OIRA. Only
Congress could get rid of OIRA because it was created by the Paperwork
Reduction Act,355 which assigns a series of discrete tasks having to do with
the review of proposals by agencies or departments to require the completion
of additional paperwork by citizens, state and local government, or private
sector entities.356
Placing the senior agency political appointees in the driver’s seat makes
sense for several reasons. For all practical purposes, agency heads are the
public face of an administration with respect to the highest profile regulatory issues, including environmental protection, food, drug, and product
safety, and preventing life-threatening hazards in the workplace. These
appointees are both confirmed by the Senate and subject to oversight by
both Houses of Congress. Without exception, they are substantive experts
in the missions their agencies and departments are assigned to undertake,
allowing them to consider the full range of policy concerns raised by a given
regulatory proposal. They are far sturdier surrogates than anonymous
White House staff working in an office “that most people have never heard
of.”357
One objection to this line of reasoning is that agency leaders become
captured by the ideologues who dominate their career staffs and lose track
of the larger issues a President must consider, including the health of the
economy. The fear of bureaucrats-run-amok hypothesizes that the civil
service can be captured by the left as well as the right. Leaving an agency
on its own will result in skewed policy outcomes, with more protections and
regulations than the country can reasonably afford or that its citizens truly
want. But this concern is theoretical and is not based in history or reality.
Its proponents would be hard pressed to think of a time period when this
phenomenon actually happened. EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus’
insistence on regulating lead in gasoline is one potential example of
so-called capture by the left: he came under heavy fire from the oil and auto
industries as well as White House officials sympathetic to their objections.358
But the Nixon White House remained ready, able, and willing to hold
Ruckelshaus as politically accountable as it dared given the popularity of
environmental measures at that historical moment. No one would argue
355.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2006).
356.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006).
357.
Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 994 (2011) (quoting Martha
Minow, Dean of the Harvard Law School, in her introduction of Sunstein when he spoke at
the school on March 1, 2010).
358.
See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN, POISONED FOR PENNIES: THE ECONOMICS OF
TOXICS AND PRECAUTION 38–39 (2008) (“William Ruckelshaus[] had declared that leaded
gasoline endangered the public health and welfare and impaired the performance of catalytic
converters . . . .”).
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today that removing lead from gas was the wrong decision.359 Instead, it is
viewed as an unequivocal success for the agency.
Some commentators argue that without OIRA, cost-benefit analysis
will recede and regulatory agencies will be free to make decisions for a host
of flakey, ill-advised reasons, including the most extreme forms of moral or
aesthetic preferences.360 This set of assertions ignores the fact that OIRA
has never drafted the regulatory impact analyses required for all rulemaking
proposals in the first instance. Rather, this task is accomplished by economists who are firmly ensconced at each of the protector agencies discussed
herein. The system would not fall apart were OIRA unavailable to oversee
it. I am no fan of cost-benefit analysis, and a robust literature explains its
faults.361 However, the methodology is firmly ensconced as an essential
element of the regulatory system. So long as the President orders agencies
to continue using it, the absence of OIRA should not make a significant
difference to the nuts and bolts of its implementation.
Removing OIRA as supervisor-in-chief will not stop industry lobbyists
from visiting the White House to get help in their efforts to persuade
agency heads to back down from a position, and anticipation of such visits
inevitably motivates the political appointee who occupies the office to
ensure that she can defend that position. Agencies would still undertake the
analyses required by statutes such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act,362 the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,363 and the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act.364 And they would still be subject to congressional
oversight and judicial review—arguably far more potent influences on their
possible excesses than OIRA. All of these mechanisms exert substantial
pressure on the agencies and help to explain why they can sometimes
appear paralyzed by indecision.

359.
See id. at 34 (“Such notable regulatory scholars as John Graham, Robert Hahn,
Richard Stewart, Cass Sunstein, and Jonathan Wiener have pointed to the influence of costbenefit analysis on the 1980s-era lead phase-down as evidence of the evenhandedness of this
analytical framework. However, that cost-benefit analysis appeared only in the last act of a
long drama.” (footnotes omitted)).
360.
See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14.
361.
See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 18 (raising the ethical and
practical problems with this methodology); Driesen, supra note 318 (demonstrating empirically that cost-benefit analysis is one of the factors that weakens the protectiveness of
pending rules); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety,
and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997 (2002) (concluding that cost estimates
are provided by regulated industries and are generally not based on empirical analysis);
Parker, supra note 18 (rebutting arguments made by proponents of the methodology).
362.
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2006).
363.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-21,
110 Stat. 857 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 28 U.S.C.).
364.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71 (2006).
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There remains the question of how to undertake the difficult and complex work of finding lasting policy solutions to cross-cutting regulatory
problems, a function OIRA does not recognize as legitimate and that is a
major reason for removing it from any role in the arena of regulatory policy
making. The problem has several dimensions: (1) review and coordination
of the annual government-wide regulatory agenda; (2) consideration of
funding issues that affect the agencies; (3) determination of whether and
how the President should support amendments to strengthen the agencies’
outmoded legal authorities; and (4) development of solutions to crosscutting issues that affect more than one agency.
The White House staff has expanded in size over the last two decades
to a number in the ballpark of 1,800 to 2,000 people.365 These resources are
adequate to support White House coordination of the annual regulatory
agenda, as well as to focus on specific rules that will have a significant
impact on the economy. So, for example, a President could decide that
energy policy was a top priority for his Administration and ask all relevant
agency heads to assemble lists of rules, guidance documents, purchasing
policies,366 and other decisions that might affect the actual, environmental,
and public health costs and benefits of various fuels, as well as proposals
with indirect effects on the energy marketplace, such as government-wide
greenhouse gas reduction policies.367 White House staff could work with
agency heads to calibrate when and how these proposals would be released,
in the process developing a narrative about why the President supports
them.
Funding shortfalls increasingly undermine the agencies’ effectiveness,
and the steady decline in their resources measured in constant dollars368
makes the alternative of supporting their permitting and licensing activities
through specific, dedicated industry fees ever more appealing. For example,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission receives ninety percent of its funding

365.
Farina, supra note 15, at 405.
366.
See, e.g., Jessica Leber, Riding a Wave of Culture Change, DOD Strives to Trim
Energy Demand, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/20/
20climatewire-riding-a-wave-of-culture-change-dod-strives-23689.html (“[T]he U.S. military,
the nation’s single largest energy consumer—at more than 1 percent of the U.S. total—has
come [far] in recognizing and reducing its reliance on fossil fuels. But experts say . . . the
military still has [far] to go . . . . Experts say making strides will require changing the culture
of an institution . . . . Several policies already are under way [including a] presidential
order . . . requir[ing] federal departments to cut energy and water demand and use more
renewable energy every year.”).
367.
Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. 248 (2010) (making “reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions a priority for Federal agencies”).
368.
STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 106.
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from licensing fees imposed on nuclear power plants.369 A second example
is Title V of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which shifts the costs of
reviewing power plant permits to their private owners and operators.370 In
some states, regulators are allowed to apply the civil penalties they collect
toward their daily operations, and this approach is worth exploring at the
federal level.371 Exploration of these alternatives is a task well-suited for a
working group of agency and outside experts convened by the White House
staff.
Updating the legal authorities available to health and safety agencies to
pursue emerging problems is a low priority for Congress unless a wellpublicized crisis somehow breaks through this legislative inertia. The
President and his White House staff are in the position to ask agency heads
to develop priorities for such amendments, and a centralized taskforce
might even discover that some of these problems can be dealt with in a
piece of legislation that affects multiple agencies at once. So, for example,
the anomaly of awarding more severe punishment for harassing a burro in a
national park than for grossly negligent conduct that results in the death
of a worker372 could be juxtaposed in such a legislative initiative, with the
President arguing that loss of life or injuries to people that are the foreseeable result of regulatory violations should incur stringent, uniform penalpenalties.
Many cross-cutting problems could be addressed by administrative
action within the discretion of the President. For example, rationalizing
and making more consistent government enforcement policies could benefit
from consideration by a White House taskforce. Any enforcement action
that does not recoup—at the very least—the avoided costs of complying
with the law that was broken has limited deterrent effect. Recovering that
amount should be the baseline for any consent decree or complaint, with
punitive assessments of civil penalties to discourage others from committing similar violations added on top of such cost recoupment. EPA has
developed a sophisticated model for calculating avoided costs,373 but as the
BP situation indicates, other agencies have much to learn from its relatively
robust approach.374 And when noncompliance causes fatal accidents, criminal

369.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2010: PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 15 (2010), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr1542/v16/sr1542v16.pdf.
370.
42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b) (2006).
371.
See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 08.19.04.09(B) (1992).
372.
See supra Part I.C.2.
373.
Enforcement Economic Models, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/econmodels/
index.html#ben (last updated Nov. 19, 2009).
374.
See supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.7.
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prosecutions should be expected. It is a cross-cutting policy change worthy
of attention from both the agencies and the Department of Justice.

CONCLUSION
All of the arguments against centralized review made here are further
supported by the fact that Presidents are under no obligation to continue
the OIRA process. If OIRA’s identity as a powerful deregulatory force is as
obvious as I claim, its continuation must constitute not just a presidential
preference, but a preference that is well-supported by the President’s constitutional role. And if a strong, anti-regulatory OIRA is what presidents
think they want, why shouldn’t they have it?
This argument is particularly salient in the context of the Obama
administration because Cass Sunstein is the best educated, most prolific
intellectual ever to serve as OIRA Administrator,375 as well as an early
supporter of the President who appears to enjoy his full confidence.376
Sunstein could have broken with OIRA’s long-standing institutional identity, instead envisioning his role as the architect of fundamental reforms that
would make the broken regulatory system work. A group of academic colleagues, including the author, urged him to consider this alternative soon
after he took office:
The U.S. regulatory system—over which OIRA has a uniquely farreaching influence—is at a critical juncture. Following years of
neglect and, more recently, outright hostility from the George W.
Bush administration, the system is in disrepair . . . . To repair the
badly broken regulatory system, the next OIRA Administrator will
need to re-imagine OIRA’s role to ensure that this little known
but powerful office is part of the solution, rather than part of the
problem.377
Sunstein not only ignored this opportunity, but continued business as usual
at OIRA.
375.
A profile in NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE described him as “certainly the most
productive and probably the most influential liberal legal scholar of his generation . . . .”
Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein Wants to Nudge Us, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 16, 2010,
at 38.
376.
Sunstein, supra note 233.
377.
Signatories of this document, entitled Reinvigorating Protection of Health, Safety,
and the Environment: The Choices Facing Cass Sunstein, include Professors John S. Applegate,
Robert L. Glicksman, Thomas O. McGarity, Sidney A. Shapiro, Amy Sinden,
Rena I. Steinzor, and Robert R.M. Verchick. JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REINVIGORATING PROTECTION OF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: THE CHOICES FACING CASS SUNSTEIN (2009), available at http://www.
progressivereform.org/articles/SunsteinOIRA901.pdf.
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When the 2010 midterm election turned against President Obama for
reasons having nothing to do with health, safety, or environmental regulations, Sunstein helped to turn the administration further toward a narrative
that is consistent with OIRA’s institutional identity: regulation has a direct
bearing on the economy, and in times of economic stress the nation cannot
afford it. We can assume that the President participated in the decision to
make this change, just as he put Sunstein in office knowing what the
appointment would mean.
Because most discussions of unitary executive theory focus on the theoretical scope of presidential authority, as opposed to the policy
ramifications of the decisions the President makes in any given context,
believers in the doctrine begin and end there.378 The President should have
whatever he wants, certainly with respect to managing the Executive
Branch. In contrast, the validity of the arguments I have made here
depends not on whether the President has the authority to continue OIRA,
but rather on whether it is a good idea for him to do so. Under-regulation is
a much more serious problem than over-regulation. Centralized White
House review should be abolished because that outcome would be best for
the American public.
The nation has embraced health, safety, and environmental regulation
as an affirmative and important role for government. Despite this broad
support for regulatory schemes, deregulatory forces have managed to hobble
the regulatory state through funding shortfalls, political interference, and
neglect of the crucial job of updating the agencies’ statutory mandates. All
of these efforts have been largely invisible to the voting public. But by the
end of the George W. Bush administration, which pursued these techniques
with a vengeance, regulatory agencies were on life support.
The worldwide recession that was in its infancy when President Obama
took office had the effect of shoving the implications of this unacceptable
state of affairs to the back burner. Even the nation’s fixation on live video
feed of the billowing plume of oil at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico was
not enough to elevate these issues.
Pragmatists might suggest that President Obama was prudent to
respond to a shift in the balance of power in Washington, D.C. But the
President and his staff have ignored the probability that in the absence of
real reform, life-threatening episodes are likely to recur, causing irrevocable
378.
Some unitary executive enthusiasts argue that presidential control is constitutionally mandated. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). Others embrace it as a
better way to run domestic policymaking. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 13; Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 13. In a notable departure from this approach, Professor Farina has warned that
accretion of executive power can have intolerable policy results for the country. See Farina,
supra note 15, at 423–24.
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damage and, not incidentally, further tarnishing the administration’s legacy.
Aggressive rulemaking and enforcement are essential antidotes to a chaotic
global economic environment that creates irresistible incentives for companies to cut corners.
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that OIRA continues to serve
as the bottleneck for protective regulation, as its founders designed it and
as its critics have long alleged it to be. It has systematically ignored the
most important problems that affect the administrative state, including
regulatory failure and agency dysfunction. OIRA is tiny, and most staff
members are economists with training in the details of cost-benefit analysis
but scant experience with the other disciplines needed to inform policy
making. All of OIRA’s Administrators have accepted its historical mission
and suffered from a lack of insight and imagination.
The President and the nation would be far better served if he abandoned the effort to centralize control over individual regulations within the
White House, instead leaving the political appointees who head the relevant agencies and departments as the first and last line of accountability for
those efforts. If this or any other President truly wants to “win the future,”
OIRA’s myopia and hostility must give way to an affirmative vision of how
government can protect those who truly cannot protect themselves.379

379.

Obama, supra note 10.
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APPENDIX

TABLE 1
THE RIA’S COMPARISON OF REGULATORY BENEFITS TO COSTS
Strong Option
Subtitle C
1. Regulatory Costs: $20,349
($230,817) to
2. Regulatory Benefits:
$102,191
($251,166) to
3. Net Benefits (2-1)
$81,842
4. Benefit/Cost Ratio
(11.343) to 5.022
(2/1)

Weak Option
Subtitle D
$8,095

Weakest Option
Subtitle “D prime”
$3,259

$1,168 to $41,761 $593 to $17,501
($6,927) to
$33,666

($2,666) to
$14,242

0.144 to 5.159

0.182 to 5.370

Present Values in $Millions at 7 percent Discount Rate over 50-Year Future
Period-of-Analysis 2012 to 2061380

380.

Comments from Ctr. for Progressive Reform, supra note 263, at 8 tbl.1.
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TABLE 2
THE RIA’S COMPUTATION OF REGULATORY BENEFITS
Strong Option
Benefit Category
Subtitle C
Groundwater
$970
Protection Benefits
Avoided Human
$504 (726 cancer
Cancer Risks
risks)
Avoided Groundwater
$466
Remediation Costs
Avoided Impoundment
$1,762 to $16,732
Spill Costs
Impact on Beneficial ($233,549) to
Use
$84,489
Scenario #1: Increase $84,489
Scenario #2: Decrease
($233,549)
(stigma)
Scenario #3: No
$0 (no impact)
impact
($230,817) to
Total Benefits:
$102,191

Weak Option
Subtitle D
$375

Weakest Option
Subtitle “D prime”
$188

$207 (296 cancer $104 (148 cancer
risks)
risks)
$168

$84

$793 to $7,590

$405 to $3,795

$0 to $33,796

$0 to $13,518

$33,796

$13,518

$0 (no impact)

$0 (no impact)

$0 (no impact)

$0 (no impact)

$1,168 to $41,761 $593 to $17,501

Present Values in $Millions at 7 percent Discount Rate over 50-Year Future
Period-of-Analysis 2012 to 2061381

381.

Comments from Ctr. for Progressive Reform, supra note 263, at 9 tbl.2.
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